Risk Reporting for Developers’ Internal AI Model Use
Proposes a harmonized standard for frontier developers' internal-use risk reports, aligned with California SB 53, New York RAISE Act, and the EU GPAI Code of Practice.
Research / Sources
Policy research on advanced AI security and governance. www.iaps.ai
Proposes a harmonized standard for frontier developers' internal-use risk reports, aligned with California SB 53, New York RAISE Act, and the EU GPAI Code of Practice.
A IAPS memo analyses the MAIM deterrence argument, in which great powers would sabotage rivals' ASI races, reformulating its claims and assessing the evidence for and against each.
A policy report arguing that competitive pressure could push AI developers away from human-readable chain-of-thought reasoning, undermining monitoring, and proposing governance options to preserve CoT monitorability.
Argues that frontier AI models kept hidden inside corporate labs pose dual-use and security risks, and proposes transparency and oversight measures for these privately held systems.
Argues that internal frontier AI systems face theft and sabotage risks plus internal rogue deployment, self-exfiltration and successor sabotage, and recommends security practices, expanded evaluations and government visibility.
Argues the US government must help AI developers secure unreleased internal models against theft and sabotage, since stolen frontier models could strengthen Chinese military and economic capabilities.
Analyzes 80 safety papers from Anthropic, Google DeepMind and OpenAI (2022-2024), mapping where corporate safety research is concentrated, where gaps lie, and how incentives shape it.