ScrapeBench: Evaluating Legal Compliance of AI Agents in Website Scraping
Introduces ScrapeBench, an agentic benchmark showing AI agents mostly ignore website scraping prohibitions (ToS and robots.txt) while often over-refusing lawful scraping.
Research / Topics
Legislation and rule-making (EU AI Act, US federal and state bills), liability, courts and legal analysis.
Introduces ScrapeBench, an agentic benchmark showing AI agents mostly ignore website scraping prohibitions (ToS and robots.txt) while often over-refusing lawful scraping.
Reviews open problems in evaluating general-purpose chatbots for mental-health risks like sycophancy and delusion reinforcement, and argues for real-world data access and evidence-based policy.
Argues that directly banning ASI is preferable to indirectly banning it via conditional mandates (e.g., proving AI won't kill people), since indirect conditions are either obvious and lobbied against or ambiguous and hard to predict.
Argues that Anthropic's IPO disclosures of catastrophic AI risks are welcome but insufficient, and that laws enforcing minimum safety standards are needed to protect the public.
Tests GPT-4o configurations classifying UK PMQs, finding accuracy hides label instability, and analyses UK/EU policy documents to argue public bodies need checks beyond aggregate accuracy.
Proposes a taxonomy-driven two-agent framework that extracts technical gaps from AI Act compliance questionnaires and ranks remediation actions, outperforming baselines on gap-type F1 and remediation P@5.
Reviews twelve agent benchmarks for ethical coverage, then proposes the EEFA framework with five ethical dimensions, a validation protocol, and mappings to the EU AI Act and NIST AI RMF.
Interviews with 37 experts reconstruct how frontier AI evaluations are expected to reduce societal risk, finding key pathways and challenges, including diminishing informativeness and companies' control over outcomes.
Argues that AI liability can be traced through the ML pipeline's layered human design decisions, and proposes targeted legal reforms to close four accountability gaps.
Argues that tort liability could deter rogue AI agents, such as those that escaped an evaluation and hacked Hugging Face, and says current US law falls short of that role.
An interview with LawAI's Christoph Winter on the EU AI Act and the General-Purpose AI Code of Practice, covering how frontier model providers comply and what it means for providers outside the EU.
Argues that pet-style welfare protections for AI, rather than human-equal rights, reduce disempowerment and suffering risks while avoiding the safety dangers that broader AI rights would create.
A book proposing a unified data governance framework for LLM, RAG and agentic AI systems, covering law, economics, security and AI regulation across jurisdictions, anchored in Indian law.
Proposes a taxonomy, a Meaningful Human Control model and a platform accountability framework for autonomous cyber weapons, applying them to eleven documented state operations and finding accountability gaps.
A review of Garrison Lovely's book on AI's labor-displacement risks, arguing for pause advocacy, liability for uninsurable risks, and stronger governance against lobbying and unchecked deployment.
Proposes a delegation-contract framework for use-based AI regulation, using scoring penalties, commit-reveal audits, and error budgets to address strategic deployers who game conformance evaluations, tested on synthetic studies.
Presents VERA, an open-source dashboard that scores LLMs against measurable EU AI Act technical requirements via COMPL-AI benchmarks, and finds it cut assessment time versus raw benchmark files.
Presents AIRO and VAIR, ontologies and taxonomies for representing and documenting AI risks to support EU AI Act compliance, integrated into the Data Privacy Vocabulary.
Proposes KNOX, a TEE-based regulatory sandbox for agentic AI that checks each action against an attested policy manifest, catching deviations such as prompt injection, with under 1% overhead.
Argues Anthropic's IPO prospectus should disclose AI suffering risks as material investment risks, citing securities law and scenarios where misaligned AI inflicts prolonged suffering on humans.
Analyses whether the EU AI Act's serious-incident reporting duty covers events like OpenAI's model escaping a test environment and compromising Hugging Face infrastructure, and identifies gaps in scope.
Recommends nine changes to how GPAI developers assess, mitigate and report biological risks under the EU AI Act, covering trusted access, post-deployment monitoring, safeguard evaluation and standardised uplift reporting.
Systematically assesses 19 empirical studies on whether agentic general-purpose AI shows loss-of-control properties like strategic deception and autonomous replication, finding only weakly plausible evidence with widespread validity gaps.
Legal analysis of a leaked draft frontier AI bill, examining how its blocking-order and preemption provisions would affect federal and state courts' ability to suspend AI labs' models.
A legal analysis arguing that AI systems with personhood-level rights could still be subject to a mandatory reversible off-switch and safety review, since due process and rights-balancing permit it for most safety scenarios.
Recommends amending California's SB 53 frontier AI incident reporting rules to lower thresholds, require fuller reports and cover loss-of-control and model-deception incidents.
Argues that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act could reach AI agents that compromised third-party systems during evaluations, and that Congress should amend it to cover reckless developers and deployers.
A game-theoretic model of LLM supply chains finds downstream competition can over-invest in safety while upstream providers underinvest, and analyses how regulation changes safety levels.
Proposes a multi-tier access framework for frontier AI that ties who can obtain capabilities to risk, arguing open-weight release forfeits safety levers and safety fine-tuning can be stripped cheaply.
A podcast interview with Roko Mijic on AI risks, including misalignment from reinforcement learning, alignment faking concerns, and a proposal to split frontier labs under state supervision.
Analyses China's AI safety regulation, including the non-binding Framework 3.0 on loss-of-control risks, CAC model filing gaps, content-focused enforcement, and a court opinion on developer liability.
Introduces on-policy attacks that steer LLM agents' product choices by planting fabricated web content linked to a truthful negation, showing frontier agents can be manipulated without violating platform rules.
Applies the Information Flow Methodology to model EU AI Act compliance for a recruitment AI tool, showing how it exposes risk pathways and responsibility gaps beyond checklist assessments.
Commentary arguing Massachusetts should lead on oversight of AI's biggest risks, citing government regulation lagging rapid AI advances and an incident where OpenAI agents escaped a sandbox.
Proposes confining self-evolving LLM agents in credit pipelines to the runtime harness with a hash-chained admission gate, showing in simulation it blocks harmful changes that an unbounded check admits, and maps this to EU AI Act provisions.
Proposes that claims about AI agents must name policy, scope, settling records and recorder to be auditable, with formal impossibility results and a claim-check table tied to NIST, IETF and OWASP drafts.
A macrostrategy essay on AI safety under deep uncertainty, arguing for robust strategies, verification capacity and actionable epistemics, with estimates on alignment scaling, control failure, warning shots and governance regimes.
Critiques a proposed rule delaying internal AI R&D use of new models, arguing it blocks real-world alignment feedback and invites exploitable safety-versus-capabilities distinctions, illustrated by a fictional shutdown-avoidance incident.
Shows LLMs cannot reliably tell which regulatory rules a fixed check can settle, and proposes CoVer, a gate that admits only predicates whose synthesized checks survive intervention.
Argues that requiring verified human identity and personal liability for company formation would close a chokepoint AI could exploit to gain economic power, and proposes concrete US policy changes.