Research / Sources
Policy research on advanced AI security and governance. www.iaps.ai
Proposes deploying honeypots as decoy opportunities for unauthorized actions inside production environments to detect and pause misbehaving AI agents, arguing this is a promising, underused defense for internal agent deployments.
Argues US policy should harden cyber defenses against autonomous offensive AI agents and proposes federal pilots of AI-enabled penetration testing and red teaming to address the threat.
IAPS reacts to a White House executive order on frontier AI security, assessing its cyber-defense provisions, voluntary developer collaboration, and unresolved implementation questions.
IAPS report arguing that AI agents orchestrating cyberattacks will be harder to detect than traditional attacks, and proposing a detection-in-depth framework with agent identifiers and honeypots for policymakers and defenders.
A policy memo arguing the U.S. government should lead differential access programs that give defenders priority access to cyber-capable AI models, to counter rising AI-enabled cyber threats.
Report defines highly autonomous cyber-capable agents (HACCAs), forecasts their arrival, outlines five operational tactics for sustaining attacks, and analyzes strategic and tail risks of frontier AI offensive cyber capabilities.
IAPS experts review the US AI Action Plan through a national security and AGI-risk lens, praising its goals and identifying gaps and implementation considerations.
This IAPS report proposes three differential access approaches that let frontier AI developers tilt dual-use cyber capabilities toward defenders, with a framework for choosing among them based on risk.
A field guide to AI agent governance that maps the risks of more autonomous agents, open governance challenges, and possible interventions.
IAPS's response to a US BIS proposed rule recommends expanding reporting of frontier AI models and compute clusters to third-party evaluators, civil society, and public bodies, with ad hoc reporting and information sharing.
IAPS's response to NIST's AI 800-1 draft recommends restructuring misuse-risk guidance for dual-use foundation models around the product lifecycle, considering tool affordances, and adding post-deployment and model-theft guidance.
IAPS's response to a DoD RFI urges DoD-wide testing, evaluation and security standards for dual-use foundation models acquired through the defense industrial base, plus information-sharing with the US AI Safety Institute.
A UK policy memo recommending government market-shaping to grow the AI assurance technology industry, covering AI alignment, security and auditing tools, and the regulatory and demand uncertainties that hold it back.
A policy memo proposing Congress create an early warning system for novel AI-enabled threats, with BIS as a clearinghouse for dual-use capability evaluation reports from frontier developers.