How to Secure Advanced U.S. Chips
A policy memo arguing the U.S. should close gaps in advanced chip export controls, covering remote cloud access, smuggling, H200 exports and chipmaking equipment, to limit China's frontier AI development.
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Policy research on advanced AI security and governance. www.iaps.ai
A policy memo arguing the U.S. should close gaps in advanced chip export controls, covering remote cloud access, smuggling, H200 exports and chipmaking equipment, to limit China's frontier AI development.
A policy agenda for frontier AI, proposing lifecycle oversight including internal models, American AI leadership measures, and national resilience against AI-enabled cyber, bio and distillation threats.
Proposes near-term verification mechanisms, covering end-location, end-user and end-use checks, to help US policymakers enforce AI chip export controls within about a year.
Explains the Stop Stealing Our Chips Act, a bill that would create a whistleblower reward program to strengthen US enforcement of AI chip export controls against diversion to China.
Report argues that AI data centers housing frontier compute are attractive targets for nation-state adversaries and recommends building security into them from the outset, especially for facilities outside the West.
Argues that compute should be treated as a strategic resource like oil or steel, scarce, controllable and concentrated, with implications for AI governance and competition.
IAPS experts review the US AI Action Plan through a national security and AGI-risk lens, praising its goals and identifying gaps and implementation considerations.
Proposes a whistleblower incentive program modeled on the SEC's to improve enforcement of U.S. export controls on AI chips and other compute-related technology.
Catalogues evidence of large-scale AI chip smuggling into China and recommends policy measures, including a whistleblower program, notification rules, and location verification, to strengthen export-control enforcement.
Argues that AI chip smuggling is widespread and that the US must strengthen its AI chip export controls, eliminating smuggling as a first step to outcompete China.
Analyzes how high-end consumer GPUs could let Chinese actors circumvent US AI chip export controls, estimating they could acquire millions and reach significant AI capabilities, and recommends policy and GPU-maker measures.
Argues that Congress should increase funding for the Bureau of Industry and Security so it can enforce export controls on weapons-of-mass-destruction and sensitive technologies amid US-China tech rivalry.
A primer on Chinese AI chip manufacturing, covering the semiconductor industry and US export controls, to help forecast China's indigenous AI compute progress under compute governance.
Overview of AI chip smuggling into China, its current and future trajectories, and four recommendations for US policymakers to understand and mitigate large-scale smuggling of AI chips.
A career review arguing that building expertise in AI hardware can help reduce AI risks and improve governance decisions, drawing on compute governance work.
Examines how AI chips could be smuggled into China at scale, estimates likely quantities, and proposes six countermeasures to reduce large-scale export-control evasion.