America’s Seed Fund Should Back AI Resilience Startups
Proposes a $100 million NSF AI Resilience Pilot through America's Seed Fund to fund startups building defenses against AI-enabled cyber, bio and autonomous-agent threats.
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Expert essays on AI safety, policy and governance. ai-frontiers.org
Proposes a $100 million NSF AI Resilience Pilot through America's Seed Fund to fund startups building defenses against AI-enabled cyber, bio and autonomous-agent threats.
An excerpt arguing that halting the race toward AGI is feasible, and that commercial incentives, not technical inevitability, are what keep frontier AI development going despite extinction-risk warnings.
An opinion piece arguing that US-China deterrence based on mutual assured AI malfunction (MAIM) could provide a Cold War-style starting point for cooperation on catastrophic rogue-AI risks.
Argues that US policymakers should adapt the TRIP terrorism-insurance data call to estimate and manage catastrophic risks from frontier AI, using scenario-based insurer pricing exercises.
Argues governments should avoid over-regulating frontier AI now while building institutional capacity to govern transformative systems later, proposing a strategy called radical optionality.
Argues that a large AI capabilities lead could make nuclear counterforce strikes feasible, eroding mutual assured destruction and destabilising great-power nuclear deterrence.
An opinion piece arguing that fear of AI launching nuclear weapons, despite funded research and media attention, is overstated relative to human-driven nuclear risks and should not dominate AI risk policy.
Responds to critiques of Mutually Assured AI Malfunction, a deterrence framework for superintelligence races, arguing that ASI development fuels state tensions and assessing stability and redline issues.
Summarises Yudkowsky and Soares's book arguing that building superhuman AI by current methods likely leads to losing control, with extinction-level risk, and calling for coordinated action against the race dynamics.
An essay arguing that releasing AGI, whether deliberately through open-sourcing or through leaks and theft, would be catastrophic and could displace humanity, and that AGI should not be built until it can be kept under control.
Argues that the Mutual Assured AI Malfunction deterrence framework depends on reliably observing rivals' progress toward superintelligence, and that such observation is harder than its authors acknowledge.
Argues that framing AI governance around the nuclear non-proliferation analogy, such as an IAEA-style agency, is conceptually flawed and inflates expectations about controlling model proliferation, and recommends sector-specific governance instead.
An essay using Postrel's dynamism-versus-stasis framing to argue that critiques of AI safety prescriptions often miss the mark, and that the debate should be framed around that split.
Examines whether a Manhattan Project-style AI program could secure model weights against foreign theft, drawing on RAND's proposed five security levels and the feasibility of the required infrastructure.
Argues the US and China should pursue a dual-track strategy, including a deal on AI safety, to manage catastrophic AI risks such as cyber and biological attacks and loss of control amid geopolitical competition.
An opinion piece arguing that the US and China share an interest in avoiding a race to artificial superintelligence, comparing it to the nuclear arms race and critiquing recent US policy moves.