We’re Failing to Evaluate How Biologists Could Misuse AI
Argues that AI biorisk evaluations focus on novices while expert biologists with AI assistance could pose greater misuse risks, and that this gap needs addressing.
Research / Sources
AI Frontiers
Expert essays on AI safety, policy and governance. ai-frontiers.org
Focus All
Topic Security & misuse
Date Any time
America’s Seed Fund Should Back AI Resilience Startups
Proposes a $100 million NSF AI Resilience Pilot through America's Seed Fund to fund startups building defenses against AI-enabled cyber, bio and autonomous-agent threats.
AI Jailbreak Disclosure Is Broken. Here’s How to Fix It
Argues that AI researchers lack a safe way to report jailbreaks of frontier models and proposes adopting cybersecurity-style responsible disclosure norms, citing universal jailbreaks and malicious misuse.
An AI Capabilities Gap Can Endanger Nuclear Deterrence
Argues that a large AI capabilities lead could make nuclear counterforce strikes feasible, eroding mutual assured destruction and destabilising great-power nuclear deterrence.
AI Will Not Start a Nuclear War, but Humans Might
An opinion piece arguing that fear of AI launching nuclear weapons, despite funded research and media attention, is overstated relative to human-driven nuclear risks and should not dominate AI risk policy.
The Robot in Your Living Room Has No Rulebook
Argues that consumer humanoid robots such as Figure 03 and Unitree R1 are entering homes faster than rules govern them, and that regulators should set safety, privacy and liability standards now.
AI Deterrence Is Our Best Option
Responds to critiques of Mutually Assured AI Malfunction, a deterrence framework for superintelligence races, arguing that ASI development fuels state tensions and assessing stability and redline issues.
The Hidden AI Frontier
An opinion piece arguing that frontier AI models kept private inside labs pose hidden dual-use risks, and calling for transparency and third-party oversight of these systems while protecting them from theft.
Uncontained AGI Would Replace Humanity
An essay arguing that releasing AGI, whether deliberately through open-sourcing or through leaks and theft, would be catastrophic and could displace humanity, and that AGI should not be built until it can be kept under control.
Can the US Prevent AGI from Being Stolen?
Examines whether a Manhattan Project-style AI program could secure model weights against foreign theft, drawing on RAND's proposed five security levels and the feasibility of the required infrastructure.
The Challenges of Governing AI Agents
Argues that autonomous AI agents that act in digital environments are being deployed faster than governance can keep up, and examines the risks they pose, such as cyberattacks and fraud, and the challenges of governing them.