A Cold War Blueprint for the AI Age
An opinion piece arguing that US-China deterrence based on mutual assured AI malfunction (MAIM) could provide a Cold War-style starting point for cooperation on catastrophic rogue-AI risks.
Research / Sources
Expert essays on AI safety, policy and governance. ai-frontiers.org
An opinion piece arguing that US-China deterrence based on mutual assured AI malfunction (MAIM) could provide a Cold War-style starting point for cooperation on catastrophic rogue-AI risks.
Argues that the US and China could enable an international AI slowdown now by giving auditors comprehensive access to major AI companies, rather than waiting for futuristic verification technology.
Argues that a large AI capabilities lead could make nuclear counterforce strikes feasible, eroding mutual assured destruction and destabilising great-power nuclear deterrence.
Analyses the US order restricting non-American access to Anthropic's frontier models and what it means for European AI sovereignty, arguing Europe should plan for such controls and identifying policy priorities.
Analyses over 60 mainland Chinese media sources covering Western AI safety essays and finds sympathetic, credible summaries that avoid US-China competition, with implications for international AI policy.
Argues US chip export policy should manage the relative compute advantage over China rather than just keeping chips a generation behind, as H200 sales to China proceed.
Examines whether China's new AI safety body, CnAISDA, and domestic voluntary safety commitments signal a serious national commitment to frontier AI safety or are mostly symbolic.
Responds to critiques of Mutually Assured AI Malfunction, a deterrence framework for superintelligence races, arguing that ASI development fuels state tensions and assessing stability and redline issues.
Argues that the Mutual Assured AI Malfunction deterrence framework depends on reliably observing rivals' progress toward superintelligence, and that such observation is harder than its authors acknowledge.
Assesses whether US semiconductor export controls on China have slowed its chipmaking, AI model development and AI infrastructure market share, finding mixed success, mainly through compute governance.
Argues that framing AI governance around the nuclear non-proliferation analogy, such as an IAEA-style agency, is conceptually flawed and inflates expectations about controlling model proliferation, and recommends sector-specific governance instead.
Argues that international AI agreements need technical assurance technologies so rival nations can verify compliance, reducing the assurance dilemma that drives an AI arms race and risks from frontier AI.
Reports on US bills proposing location verification for export-controlled AI chips to curb smuggling to China, and the policy debate around enforcing chip export controls.
Argues the US and China should pursue a dual-track strategy, including a deal on AI safety, to manage catastrophic AI risks such as cyber and biological attacks and loss of control amid geopolitical competition.
An opinion piece arguing that the US and China share an interest in avoiding a race to artificial superintelligence, comparing it to the nuclear arms race and critiquing recent US policy moves.