Priorities for Frontier AI Policy
A policy agenda for frontier AI, proposing lifecycle oversight including internal models, American AI leadership measures, and national resilience against AI-enabled cyber, bio and distillation threats.
Research / Sources
Policy research on advanced AI security and governance. www.iaps.ai
A policy agenda for frontier AI, proposing lifecycle oversight including internal models, American AI leadership measures, and national resilience against AI-enabled cyber, bio and distillation threats.
Proposes closing a gap in US export controls so advanced AI chips rented through cloud services remain covered, and recommends broadening the Senate bill's definition of cloud infrastructure.
IAPS reacts to a White House executive order on frontier AI security, assessing its cyber-defense provisions, voluntary developer collaboration, and unresolved implementation questions.
A policy memo recommending follow-up U.S. executive and congressional measures against AI distillation attacks, linking model theft to semiconductor export controls and national security.
Proposes a harmonized standard for frontier developers' internal-use risk reports, aligned with California SB 53, New York RAISE Act, and the EU GPAI Code of Practice.
A policy memo arguing that AI decision-support systems in military targeting fall outside DoD lethal-autonomy rules, and recommending safeguards for reliability and meaningful human oversight.
A policy memo arguing for government action against AI distillation attacks, including Entity List additions, sanctions, and a NIST-led defensive framework for frontier model capability extraction.
Explains the Stop Stealing Our Chips Act, a bill that would create a whistleblower reward program to strengthen US enforcement of AI chip export controls against diversion to China.
A policy report arguing that competitive pressure could push AI developers away from human-readable chain-of-thought reasoning, undermining monitoring, and proposing governance options to preserve CoT monitorability.
A policy memo proposing a national CAISI+ center in the US Commerce Department for frontier model evaluations of catastrophic risks, emergency assessment, and AI security research, with budget and infrastructure recommendations.
Proposes a whistleblower incentive program modeled on the SEC's to improve enforcement of U.S. export controls on AI chips and other compute-related technology.
A policy comment to the US Bureau of Industry and Security recommending how to steer global AI compute and chip diffusion through export controls to preserve American AI leadership.
Compares US and Chinese policy approaches to governing general-purpose AI, identifying divergences in regulation focus, principles, and international governance, and their implications for cooperation on AI safety and security.
IAPS's response to a US BIS proposed rule recommends expanding reporting of frontier AI models and compute clusters to third-party evaluators, civil society, and public bodies, with ad hoc reporting and information sharing.
A UK policy memo recommending government market-shaping to grow the AI assurance technology industry, covering AI alignment, security and auditing tools, and the regulatory and demand uncertainties that hold it back.
A policy memo proposing Congress create an early warning system for novel AI-enabled threats, with BIS as a clearinghouse for dual-use capability evaluation reports from frontier developers.
Proposes a Coordinated Disclosure of Dual-Use Capabilities process, with a government clearinghouse receiving reports of dangerous AI capabilities so defenders get early warning and time to respond.
Suggests agenda topics for US-China track II dialogues on advanced AI risks, such as developer best practices, national and international governance, that avoid leaking proliferation-sensitive information.
Proposes responsible reporting of safety-critical information from frontier AI developers to government, industry and civil society, with voluntary and regulatory mechanisms for implementing it.
A systematic search of US federal agencies identifies regulatory case studies, using measures like expertise, risk assessment and enforcement, that could inform how advanced AI should be regulated.
Examines the US Federal Select Agent Program as a biosecurity precedent and draws lessons for AI regulation, covering development-phase licensing, regulatory expertise, and risk-based versus list-based approaches.
A consensus paper from many researchers outlining risks from advanced AI, including loss of human control, and proposing urgent priorities for AI R&D and governance.