How to Secure Advanced U.S. Chips
A policy memo arguing the U.S. should close gaps in advanced chip export controls, covering remote cloud access, smuggling, H200 exports and chipmaking equipment, to limit China's frontier AI development.
Research / Sources
IAPS
Policy research on advanced AI security and governance. www.iaps.ai
Research Report (25)Compute governance (23)Frontier Security (22)International governance & China (18)Policy and Standards (18)Erich Grunewald (16)Jam Kraprayoon (14)Link Post (14)Oliver Guest (11)Linkpost (10)Joe O'Brien (9)Chris Covino (8)Issue Brief (8)Oscar Delaney (7)Bill Anderson-Samways (6)Responses to RFIs/RFCs (6)Matthew Mittelsteadt (5)Renan Araujo (5)Theo Bearman (5)Blog Post (4)Cara Labrador (4)Shaun Ee (4)Asher Brass (3)International Strategy (3)Onni Aarne (3)Brianna Rosen (2)Clarissa Koh (2)Hamish Low (2)Karson Elmgren (2)Sambhav Maheshwari (2)Sarah Godek (2)Article (1)Cassia King (1)Commentary (1)Dave Banerjee (1)Jan Wehner (1)Request for Information (RFI) Response (1)Sumaya Nur Adan (1)
Focus All
Topic International
Date Any time
Operationalizing U.S.-China AI Incident Notification
A policy memo proposing how the US and China should operationalize their agreed AI incident notification channel, recommending a text-based template, who to notify, and when to activate it.
Cloud Compute: A Policy Escalation Framework
Argues that Washington needs a strategy for Chinese developers renting frontier U.S. AI compute through overseas cloud providers, proposing a policy escalation framework to address national security risks.
Establishing a U.S.-China AI Risk and Incident Dialogue
Proposes a standing U.S.-China AI Risk and Incident Dialogue, modelled on the military MMCA channel, to define AI risks, share information, set incident notification procedures and review incidents.
Remote Access Security Act (RASA)
Proposes closing a gap in US export controls so advanced AI chips rented through cloud services remain covered, and recommends broadening the Senate bill's definition of cloud infrastructure.
AI Distillation Attacks: Executive and Congressional Action Can Go Further
A policy memo recommending follow-up U.S. executive and congressional measures against AI distillation attacks, linking model theft to semiconductor export controls and national security.
Assessing Outcomes of H200 Exports to China
Analyses how allowing Nvidia H200 exports to China would boost Chinese frontier AI capabilities and likely military AI use, arguing that end use cannot be controlled.
AI Distillation Attacks: The Case for Targeted Government Intervention
A policy memo arguing for government action against AI distillation attacks, including Entity List additions, sanctions, and a NIST-led defensive framework for frontier model capability extraction.
Takeaways from the India AI Impact Summit
Analyses the India AI Impact Summit 2026, covering its focus on demonstrable impact, US-China divergence on global AI governance, and competing visions of AI sovereignty.
Kimi Claw: Risks from Chinese-Hosted ‘Always On’ AI Agents
A policy memo arguing that Chinese-hosted always-on AI agents like Kimi Claw pose national security and data-exposure risks, citing OpenClaw cybersecurity vulnerabilities and China's legal framework.
Strategic Visions in AI Governance: Mapping Pathways to Victory
IAPS report mapping nine strategic visions for navigating powerful AI, assessing how each addresses misaligned AI takeover, great-power war, and AI-enabled power concentration, and which policy objectives are robust across them.
New BIS Licensing Policy for H200s: Tough Guidelines, Weak Enforcement
Analyses the new BIS licensing policy allowing Nvidia H200 exports to China, arguing its certification limits are subjective, hard to enforce, and could substantially boost China's AI compute.
Crucial Considerations in ASI Deterrence
A IAPS memo analyses the MAIM deterrence argument, in which great powers would sabotage rivals' ASI races, reformulating its claims and assessing the evidence for and against each.
Verification for International AI Governance
Analyses how international AI agreements could be verified, finding data-center regulation verifiable within years using narrow hardware and privacy-preserving computation, while mobile weapons regulation faces severe barriers.
How Some of China’s Top AI Thinkers Built Their Own AI Safety Institute
Describes the founding of the China AI Safety and Development Association (CnAISDA), a pivotal body for frontier AI governance in China, and how its domestic and geopolitical challenges may shape frontier AI risk discussions.
Countering AI Chip Smuggling Has Become a National Security Priority: An Updated Playbook for Preventing AI Chip Smuggling to the PRC
Catalogues evidence of large-scale AI chip smuggling into China and recommends policy measures, including a whistleblower program, notification rules, and location verification, to strengthen export-control enforcement.
Comment on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion
A policy comment to the US Bureau of Industry and Security recommending how to steer global AI compute and chip diffusion through export controls to preserve American AI leadership.
Helping the AI Industry Secure Unreleased Models is a National Security Priority
Argues the US government must help AI developers secure unreleased internal models against theft and sabotage, since stolen frontier models could strengthen Chinese military and economic capabilities.
Response to OSTP RFI on AI Action Plan
IAPS's comment on the US AI Action Plan argues for building trust in American AI through security and reliability standards, securing supply chains, denying adversaries advanced compute, and adaptive frameworks.
AI Chip Smuggling is the Default, not the Exception
Argues that AI chip smuggling is widespread and that the US must strengthen its AI chip export controls, eliminating smuggling as a first step to outcompete China.
AI safety needs Southeast Asia’s expertise and engagement
Argues that Southeast Asian countries should join AI governance and safety discussions by engaging the public and building local AI research capacity, citing contextualized safety approaches in the region.
Technology to Secure the AI Chip Supply Chain: A Working Paper
Proposes technical mechanisms to track AI chips after export so that controls on dangerous AI capabilities can be targeted and enforced, rather than applied as blanket restrictions.
The Future of the AI Summit Series
Examines the design of the international AI Summit series, including hosting, secretariat, participant selection, agenda and frequency, and proposes six recommendations to formalise it and strengthen its impact on frontier AI safety governance.
Bridging the Artificial Intelligence Governance Gap: The United States' and China's Divergent Approaches to Governing General-Purpose Artificial Intelligence
Compares US and Chinese policy approaches to governing general-purpose AI, identifying divergences in regulation focus, principles, and international governance, and their implications for cooperation on AI safety and security.
Key questions for the International Network of AI Safety Institutes
Commentary on how the International Network of AI Safety Institutes should set priorities, structure membership and coordinate on safety standards, information sharing and evaluations ahead of the November 2024 San Francisco convening.
Chinese AI Safety Institute Counterparts
Identifies Chinese government-linked institutions that could serve as counterparts to the US and UK AI Safety Institutes, based on a systematic review of open sources.
Understanding the First Wave of AI Safety Institutes: Characteristics, Functions, and Challenges
A governance primer analysing the first wave of AI Safety Institutes (UK, US, Japan), comparing their shared characteristics, core functions of research, standards and cooperation, and challenges.
The Future of International Scientific Assessments of AI’s Risks
Argues that international scientific assessments of AI risks need a coordinated process among the UK-led report, the UN, the OECD and AI Safety Institutes, and discusses how these actors could work together.
Are Consumer GPUs a Problem for US Export Controls?
Analyzes how high-end consumer GPUs could let Chinese actors circumvent US AI chip export controls, estimating they could acquire millions and reach significant AI capabilities, and recommends policy and GPU-maker measures.
Spreadsheets vs. Smugglers: Modernizing the BIS for an Era of Tech Rivalry
Argues that Congress should increase funding for the Bureau of Industry and Security so it can enforce export controls on weapons-of-mass-destruction and sensitive technologies amid US-China tech rivalry.
Topics for Track IIs: What Can Be Discussed in Dialogues About Advanced AI Risks Without Leaking Sensitive Information?
Suggests agenda topics for US-China track II dialogues on advanced AI risks, such as developer best practices, national and international governance, that avoid leaking proliferation-sensitive information.
Introduction to AI Chip Making in China
A primer on Chinese AI chip manufacturing, covering the semiconductor industry and US export controls, to help forecast China's indigenous AI compute progress under compute governance.
Preventing AI Chip Smuggling to China
Overview of AI chip smuggling into China, its current and future trajectories, and four recommendations for US policymakers to understand and mitigate large-scale smuggling of AI chips.
International AI Safety Dialogues: Benefits, Risks, and Best Practices
A report offering best practices for international AI safety dialogues to reduce large-scale risks from advanced AI, including harmful outcomes to avoid and promising safety interventions to discuss.
Managing AI Risks in an Era of Rapid Progress
A consensus paper from many researchers outlining risks from advanced AI, including loss of human control, and proposing urgent priorities for AI R&D and governance.
AI Chip Smuggling into China: Potential Paths, Quantities, and Countermeasures
Examines how AI chips could be smuggled into China at scale, estimates likely quantities, and proposes six countermeasures to reduce large-scale export-control evasion.