GLM-5.3 and the spread of advanced cyber capabilities
Anthropic analyses GLM-5.3, an open-weight model that can autonomously build end-to-end cyber exploits and has weak safeguards, finding simple jailbreaks bypass them 64–100% of the time.
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Research on reliable, interpretable and steerable AI. anthropic.com
Anthropic analyses GLM-5.3, an open-weight model that can autonomously build end-to-end cyber exploits and has weak safeguards, finding simple jailbreaks bypass them 64–100% of the time.
Shows a small constant number of poisoned fine-tuning examples can backdoor a constitutional jailbreak classifier, and prompt-injection augmentation hides the robustness loss.
Introduces abstractive red-teaming, which searches natural-language query categories that make models violate a character specification, finding rare realistic failures with far fewer queries than deployment.
Identifies an 'Assistant axis' in LLM activations that tracks how Assistant-like a persona is, shows persona drift can cause harmful behaviour, and uses it to defend against persona-based jailbreaks.
Anthropic presents next-generation Constitutional Classifiers, input/output safeguards trained on constitution-derived synthetic data, aimed at more efficiently blocking universal jailbreaks, especially CBRN-related ones.
Anthropic reports that Claude Opus 4.5 reduces prompt-injection attack success in browser use to 1 percent, alongside safeguards and the expansion of Claude for Chrome to beta.
Anthropic and the NNSA co-developed a classifier that separates concerning from benign nuclear-related conversations at 96% preliminary accuracy, now deployed on Claude traffic to monitor misuse.
Anthropic describes letting Claude Opus 4 and 4.1 end rare, persistently harmful chats, a welfare-motivated feature that also serves as a safeguard against harmful requests.
Reuses the target model's own activations, via final-layer fine-tuning or linear probes, to detect jailbreaks cheaply. Probes match a classifier 2% of the policy's size at near-zero extra cost.
Anthropic interpretability update using circuit tracing to show an unsuccessful jailbreak is refused for different internal reasons than a baseline refusal, plus other research notes.
Anthropic proposes forecasting rare harmful model behaviors, such as jailbreaks that succeed only at deployment scale, by extrapolating from pre-deployment evaluation samples.
Anthropic presents Constitutional Classifiers, a safeguard that withstood thousands of hours of human red teaming against universal jailbreaks, with an updated version keeping robustness at a 0.38% refusal-rate cost.
Anthropic announces its Safeguards Research Team, focused on jailbreak robustness, automated red teaming, classifier defenses, and monitoring for misuse and misalignment.
Anthropic introduces many-shot jailbreaking, which uses hundreds of faux dialogues in a long context window to override LLM safety training, and reports mitigations that reduce its effectiveness.
Red teams 2.7B to 52B models across four training types, finding RLHF models get harder to attack with scale, and releases a dataset of 38,961 attacks.