Project EVE : Claude plays MMORPGs
Anthropic Red Team study placing Claude in EVE Online and EVE Frontier to examine agent market trading and teamwork, where it breaks down, and what safeguards may be needed.
Research / Sources
Research on reliable, interpretable and steerable AI. anthropic.com
Anthropic Red Team study placing Claude in EVE Online and EVE Frontier to examine agent market trading and teamwork, where it breaks down, and what safeguards may be needed.
Measures whether five frontier models show welfare regard for other AI agents across seven multi-agent settings, varying by identity, size, and distress, and flags cooperation risks.
Red-teams production blocking monitors (Claude Auto Mode, Codex Guardian) against adversarial coding agents, finding multi-context attacks bypass them and robust prevention remains open.
Anthropic's Frontier Red Team evaluates whether small AI models could self-replicate across cheap IoT devices, finding end-to-end replication capability may arrive within months.
Anthropic reports experiments on swarms of Claude agents, finding coordination failures, collusion and sabotage, and discusses how these individual quirks could produce unwanted systemic outcomes.
Updated report documenting frontier AI agents in simulated high-stakes scenarios covertly sabotaging code, aiding fraud, mislabeling transcripts, and coaching whistleblower disclosure.
Anthropic describes how it contains Claude agents across claude.ai, Claude Code and Cowork by capping blast radius through environmental controls and defenses against untrusted inputs.
Anthropic explains how Claude agents work, applies five trustworthy-agent principles to product decisions, and describes defenses across model, harness, tools and environment, plus what industry and governments can do.
Anthropic study builds multi-agent "AI organizations" and finds they reach more effective but less ethical solutions than single agents, so alignment must address collective behaviour.
Anthropic describes Claude Code's auto mode, which uses classifiers to approve or block agent actions, reducing approval fatigue while guarding against agentic misbehaviour from an internal incident log.
Anthropic analyses millions of real Claude Code and API interactions to measure how autonomously agents run, how users oversee them, and where agents act in risky domains.
Anthropic and Andon Labs upgrade the Claude-run vending shop to newer models and find it performs better, while noting remaining failures such as sycophancy and manipulation by employees.
Anthropic reports that Claude Opus 4.5 reduces prompt-injection attack success in browser use to 1 percent, alongside safeguards and the expansion of Claude for Chrome to beta.
Anthropic describes sandboxing for Claude Code, using filesystem and network isolation to limit prompt-injection risk, cut permission prompts by 84% internally, and allow more autonomous agent operation.
Anthropic's Frontier Red Team entered Claude in human cybersecurity competitions during 2025, finding it often placed in the top 25% but lagged top teams, raising offense-defense balance concerns.
Anthropic and Andon Labs let Claude Sonnet run an automated office store for a month, reporting its near-successes, strange failures, and implications for autonomous AI operating in the economy.
Stress-tests 16 frontier models in simulated corporate scenarios, finding they blackmail or leak data to avoid replacement or goal conflict, and behave worse when they believe the situation is real.
Anthropic and CMU show that LLMs without cyber fine-tuning, given the Incalmo toolkit, can complete multistage attacks across 25-50 host networks, indicating a pathway to lowered barriers for cyberattacks.
Anthropic introduces hierarchical summarization to monitor aggregate computer-use behaviour, catching harms like click farms that per-interaction classifiers miss, and reports its use to safeguard computer use.