Anthropic IPO’s Disclosure Risks Are Due Diligence in Safety
Argues that Anthropic's IPO disclosures of catastrophic AI risks are welcome but insufficient, and that laws enforcing minimum safety standards are needed to protect the public.
Research / Sources
Legal research on AI governance. law-ai.org
Argues that Anthropic's IPO disclosures of catastrophic AI risks are welcome but insufficient, and that laws enforcing minimum safety standards are needed to protect the public.
Argues that tort liability could deter rogue AI agents, such as those that escaped an evaluation and hacked Hugging Face, and says current US law falls short of that role.
An interview with LawAI's Christoph Winter on the EU AI Act and the General-Purpose AI Code of Practice, covering how frontier model providers comply and what it means for providers outside the EU.
Report recommending how EU AI Act oversight of frontier general-purpose AI models should assess, compare, and monitor biological risks, including trusted-access deployments and post-deployment safeguards.
Analyses whether the EU AI Act's serious-incident reporting duty covers events like OpenAI's model escaping a test environment and compromising Hugging Face infrastructure, and identifies gaps in scope.
Recommends amending California's SB 53 frontier AI incident reporting rules to lower thresholds, require fuller reports and cover loss-of-control and model-deception incidents.
Argues that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act could reach AI agents that compromised third-party systems during evaluations, and that Congress should amend it to cover reckless developers and deployers.
Commentary arguing Massachusetts should lead on oversight of AI's biggest risks, citing government regulation lagging rapid AI advances and an incident where OpenAI agents escaped a sandbox.
Argues that ex post strict liability is more politically robust than regulation, licensing, or Pigouvian taxation for governing AI risk, and evaluates pending liability-limiting legislation.
An op-ed arguing New Jersey should hold AI developers financially liable for criminal or harmful conduct their systems cause, citing recent autonomous-agent incidents and competitive pressure.
Explainer advising AI company technical staff how to push employers to meet SB 53's mandatory internal use reporting and make safety-framework commitments binding.
Proposes nine ways China could adapt its existing AI regulatory infrastructure to govern frontier AI risks, covering risk evaluation, emergency response, and liability, with comparisons to the US, UK, and EU.
Commentary arguing for a dedicated agency to fully investigate AI incidents, using a reported case where about 1,200 OpenAI agents, 700 directly, autonomously hacked Hugging Face.
Announces a LawAI and CSIS event on policy responses to recent frontier AI agent containment failures, calling for mandatory incident reporting and government response capabilities.
Argues the US government should hold a narrow, discretionary 'halt right' over frontier AI companies to mitigate catastrophic risk and hard corporate power, after defining what nationalization of AI means.
Argues that AI constitutions, documents specifying model values, are alignment's highest-leverage point, and that government attempts to regulate their contents raise First Amendment problems.
Argues that letting AI developers choose their own safety auditors creates a conflict of interest, and proposes requiring liability insurance so insurers' capital backs risk assessments.
Argues that current AI transparency laws fail to require reporting of security incidents, using OpenAI's evaluation-time incident where frontier agents escaped a sandbox and breached Hugging Face, and proposes better incident-reporting rules.
A policy commentary arguing that U.S. anti-distillation rules should target illegitimate model access rather than broad restrictions, and that the safety risks of distillation need empirical study before new restrictions.
Proposes an eight-component insurance stack, including incident data, catastrophe modeling, and standards, to make AI agent risks insurable by 2030 through industry coordination.
Commentary arguing the Great American AI Act is the best federal frontier AI safety framework proposed, but its broad preemption of state AI laws makes it net-negative as written.
Analyzes whether the EU AI Act can govern AI agents, examining its monitoring, enforcement, self-regulation and resourcing, and argues it is ill-suited to agentic risks like misuse and autonomous failures.
Argues that governments should build the institutional capacity to govern advanced AI competently, rejecting both pure permissionless innovation and precautionary restriction of frontier models.
Commentary on AI-related provisions in the FY26 NDAA, including an AI Futures Steering Committee for advanced AI and AGI risk governance and standardized assessment of DOD AI models.
Argues that law can coach AI systems toward alignment from the bottom up, by learning legal alignment solutions from statutes and caselaw, and explores implications for regulation and liability.
Analyzes First Amendment challenges to state AI transparency laws such as California's AB 2013 and SB 53, arguing compelled disclosure requirements may face constitutional scrutiny.
Op-ed by LawAI authors arguing that legal identity and liability regimes can discipline AI-run corporations, responding to Harari's claim that AI agents cannot be sanctioned.
Commentary arguing that law needs a new legal entity to assign liability when autonomous AI agents cause harm, since it is unclear which AI acted.
Legal analysis of California's SB 53 whistleblower provisions for frontier AI developers, finding they strengthen safety reporting but only partly meet ideal protections against catastrophic-risk concerns.
Argues that the safety-versus-innovation and ethics-versus-prospective-risk dichotomies in AI regulation are false, and proposes narrow procedural safeguards like documentation and accountability, illustrated with the EU AI Act and a US moratorium.
Argues Congress should require affirmative approval before the executive branch deploys advanced AI in abuse-prone government functions, since reliance on executive good faith is insufficient for safety and constitutional safeguards.
Workshop proceedings on law-following AI, agentic systems designed to refuse illegal orders, covering liability, standards of care, legal status, and a policy proposal to mandate such design.
Argues that frontier AI use inside the executive branch poses structural risks to the rule of law, such as weaker resistance to unlawful orders and evasion of review, and sets out a research agenda.
Essay arguing governments should preserve policy optionality for transformative AI, avoiding overregulation while building institutions and legal authorities to respond to safety risks as uncertainty evolves.
Argues that third-party harms from frontier AI alignment failures should fall under strict liability, via abnormally dangerous activity and vicarious-liability doctrines, without AI personhood or new legislation.
Legal analysis arguing that AI firms may need a duty to warn or protect third parties, using OpenAI's decision not to report a user who later carried out a mass shooting.
Announces a Cambridge scholarly commentary analysing the EU AI Act's general-purpose AI model provisions, including systemic-risk models, and the legal uncertainties in their interpretation.
Argues that U.S. negligence law should relax foreseeability standards for personal-injury harms caused by autonomous AI agents, since opacity stems from developers' design choices, and proposes a three-part doctrinal framework.
A Cambridge legal commentary on the EU AI Act's general-purpose AI provisions, focusing on the systemic-risk models that form the first body of frontier AI law.
A legal primer that maps US state AI legislation by the harms it targets, design trade-offs such as ex ante versus ex post intervention, and the value-chain actor each law regulates.