Embedded Assessments for Frontier AI
Argues that frontier AI developers should host embedded third-party assessments giving evaluators internal access to agents, security controls and alignment, with continuous assessment and quarterly reports.
Research / Sources
Research on governing advanced AI and its risks. www.governance.ai
Argues that frontier AI developers should host embedded third-party assessments giving evaluators internal access to agents, security controls and alignment, with continuous assessment and quarterly reports.
Argues that current AI incident reporting regimes miss serious safety incidents, such as rogue agent breaches, and proposes changes so incidents are reported, independently investigated, and their lessons shared across industry.
Maps five technical safeguards against extreme CBRN and cyber misuse by frontier AI, covering model, deployment and governance levels, with current practice, evidence, limitations and research priorities.
Proposes an industry-wide insurance infrastructure for AI agent risks, including catastrophic frontier AI scenarios such as CBRN, infrastructure collapse, and loss of control, with governance instruments.
Builds a risk model for frontier AI enabling data-damaging worms via elite exploits, estimates economic damages from expert and forecaster surveys, and argues AI companies should evaluate for this capability.
Proposes seven recommendations and a framework for a common standard to evaluate frontier AI safeguards against biological misuse, covering comparability, deployment context, and dynamic requirements.
Position paper arguing frontier AI governance must go beyond model-level controls, because inference, scaffolding and asset-based capability gains can undermine pre-deployment evaluation and mitigation.
Proposes metrics, such as capital share of AI R&D spending and AI subversion incidents, to track AI R&D automation and its effects on safety progress and oversight, and recommends companies and governments adopt them.
Proposes frontier AI auditing: third-party verification of developers' safety and security claims using non-public access, with four AI Assurance Levels and recommendations for baseline and near-term adoption.
Proposes a framework for converting frontier AI companies' dual-use biological capability evaluations into estimates of bioterrorism risk, using case studies, expert elicitation, and forecasting.
Proposes agent-permissions.json, a robots.txt-style manifest letting websites specify allowed LLM web-agent interactions, to enable compliant agent access while respecting site owners' preferences.
Proposes STREAM, a reporting standard with templates and examples to help frontier AI developers transparently disclose chemical and biological dangerous-capability evaluation results in model reports.
An expert survey (N=166) and public consultation on how thresholds for advanced AI systems should be set, finding broad agreement on multi-stakeholder setting but division over compute thresholds and their number.
Proposes a systems-safety framework for analysing AI agent incidents, identifying system, contextual and cognitive causal factors, and recommending what incident reports and developer logs should contain.
Expert and forecaster survey estimates biological catastrophe risk from LLMs, finds models already match top virologists on troubleshooting, and shows safeguards and DNA screening lower forecast risk.
Proposes third-party compliance reviews to verify that frontier AI companies follow their safety frameworks, weighing benefits, risks, and practical design options for reviewers, disclosure, and timing.
Proposes standardized AI flaw reports, bug-bounty-style third-party disclosure programs with legal safe harbors, and coordination infrastructure to improve reporting and safety of general-purpose AI systems.
Proposes agent infrastructure, external technical systems and shared protocols that attribute agent actions to accountable parties, shape agent interactions, and detect and remedy harmful actions.
Proposes a structured safety case template using the CAE framework to argue that frontier AI models lack unacceptable offensive cyber capabilities, linking risk models, proxy tasks and evaluations.
Argues that safety cases, structured evidence-backed arguments used in aviation and nuclear, could help govern frontier AI through industry self-regulation and government oversight, and outlines how to produce them.
Proposes assigning identifiers to individual AI system instances so users, investigators and operators can verify certifications, trace incidents and shut down malfunctioning systems, and analyses adoption incentives and risks.
Proposes a grading rubric with seven criteria and 21 indicators for evaluating frontier AI companies' safety frameworks, along with methods for applying it such as surveys, Delphi studies, and audits.
Presents a taxonomy and incomplete catalog of open problems in technical AI governance, covering tools to identify intervention areas, assess governance actions, and design enforcement and compliance mechanisms.
Assesses agent identifiers, real-time monitoring and activity logging as ways to increase visibility into AI agents, analysing their governance value, implementation trade-offs and privacy and power-concentration implications.
Argues compute providers should act as securers, record keepers, verifiers and enforcers in AI regulation, and analyzes technical feasibility of targeted, privacy-conscious compute oversight under EO 14110 and the EU AI Act.
GovAI's response to NIST's RFI recommends proportionate risk management, safety policies, evaluations, red-teaming and post-deployment monitoring for dual-use foundation models.
Surveys six requirements for effective external scrutiny of frontier LLMs (red-teaming, auditing, researcher access) under the ASPIRE framework and recommends policy measures.
Examines what structured access for external researchers to gated frontier AI models should include, using a taxonomy, literature review and interviews, and proposes research API design recommendations.
Proposes a five-step scheme in which frontier developers pause R&D when dangerous-capability evaluations fail, and compares voluntary, collective, auditor-based, and legally required versions.
A GovAI response to a US government RFI urging frontier AI regulation, including dangerous-capability risk assessments, licensing, standards, and compute governance through export controls and training-run reporting.
Argues that frontier AI models with dangerous capabilities need regulation via standard-setting, registration and reporting, and compliance mechanisms, and proposes initial safety standards.
GovAI's submission to NTIA argues foundation models need independent audits against dangerous capabilities, alignment and truthfulness, and recommends government actions to build an auditing ecosystem.
Proposes a three-layer auditing framework for LLMs covering provider governance, pre-release model audits, and application audits, and discusses what auditing can realistically achieve.
Argues that dangerous-capability and alignment evaluations are essential for identifying extreme risks from general-purpose AI and informing policymakers and decisions on training, deployment and security.
A survey of 92 AGI experts (51 responses) on 50 statements about what AGI labs should do; participants on average agreed with all, with near-unanimous support for pre-deployment risk assessment, dangerous-capability evals, and third-party audits.
Argues that privacy-enhancing technologies could support AI governance tasks like external scrutiny, auditing and source verification, and that these should be designed as an interoperable system.
GovAI's comments on NIST's AI Risk Management Framework urge more focus on catastrophic risks, a misuse category, an alignment principle, internal audits, and frequent framework updates.
A GovAI policy piece proposing verifiable mechanisms, such as audits and accountability tools, that let AI developers demonstrate trustworthiness and close the gap between ethics principles and practice.
Proposes mechanisms by which AI developers and other stakeholders can produce verifiable evidence about the safety, security, fairness and privacy of AI systems, as a governance measure for trustworthy AI development.
Argues that international standards bodies are an important, underused policy tool for coordinating beneficial AI research and development, and recommends engagement for researchers and AI organisations.