Principles for Embedded Evaluations
Apollo Research proposes principles for embedded third-party evaluations of frontier developers, verifying or falsifying safety claims about loss-of-control risks from scheming.
Research / Sources
Understanding and evaluating deceptive AI. apolloresearch.ai
Apollo Research proposes principles for embedded third-party evaluations of frontier developers, verifying or falsifying safety claims about loss-of-control risks from scheming.
Apollo Research argues that final-checkpoint external testing is insufficient for catching internal-deployment risks and that meaningful external evaluation needs embedded evaluators with employee-level access.
Presents a threat map tracing pathways from using AI to automate AI R&D toward loss of control, including misalignment passing across successive AI generations.
Apollo Research policy memo arguing that misaligned AI models deployed in high-stakes government and contractor settings should be treated as insider risk, and that existing insider-risk policies need adapting.
Apollo Research's governance team overview of its workstreams on governing internal deployment of advanced AI, EU AI Act policy, and scheming and dangerous-capability evaluation policy.
Apollo Research memo analysing whether the EU AI Act should cover internal deployment of frontier AI models, especially autonomous AI R&D, and offering interpretative pathways for regulators and providers.
Apollo Research describes its internal norms on conflicts of interest, evaluator compensation, publishing, and security for its AI safety evaluation work. It is organisational policy rather than a technical safety result.
Apollo Research primer on governing internal deployment of frontier AI, where the most advanced systems may be used privately by developers, outlining risks and governance options.
Proposes "precursory capabilities" and a zoning taxonomy so pre-deployment information sharing and tripwire thresholds can flag frontier models approaching catastrophic-risk red lines.
Apollo Research argues that high-quality frontier-model safety evals are scarce and slow to build, and calls for more resources to close this "evals gap."
Sketches evaluation-based safety case arguments that frontier AI systems are unlikely to cause catastrophic harm through covert scheming, and notes the current framework lacks crucial details.
Apollo Research describes its security norms for handling lab IP and model access while auditing frontier AI for deception, noting the policy is early-stage.