Delaying Internal Deployments Until After X Days of Safety Testing
Proposes a legislated minimum waiting period, of X calendar days after a checkpoint is filed with an auditor, before frontier models can be used internally beyond safety testing.
Research / Sources
Discussion and research on AI alignment. alignmentforum.org
Proposes a legislated minimum waiting period, of X calendar days after a checkpoint is filed with an auditor, before frontier models can be used internally beyond safety testing.
Argues that reinforcement learning drives misaligned agency, exploit-seeking and manipulation, and proposes coordinating to cut RL, designing better RL environments, and holding developers liable.
Proposes a corporate red-line and oversight framework for government AI contracts, covering human control over targeting and untargeted profiling, with a review body that issues findings but cannot block deals.
Argues the main bottleneck for AI safety is policymakers' lack of awareness of catastrophic risk, so advocacy and engagement should be prioritised over research, with supporting evidence on NGO submissions and enforcement gaps.
ControlAI's 2025 impact report describes lobbying lawmakers in the UK, US, Canada and Germany to support a ban on superintelligence development, citing extinction-risk concerns and early policy results.
Podcast interview with Guive Assadi arguing that granting AIs property rights would deter them from stealing from or killing humans, since expropriation would undermine the property system they rely on.
Interview with law professor Peter Salib on his paper arguing that granting AIs contract, property, and tort rights could reduce incentives for AI-human conflict and takeover, via game-theoretic reasoning.
Blog post surveying a defense-in-depth toolkit for mitigating AI scheming, covering architecture choices, control, white-box detection, prompting, and enforcement, and estimating risk reduction from roughly 25% to 10%.
Proposes and ranks object-level interventions against gradual disempowerment from AI, mainly mandatory model interoperability for alignment and fine-tuning, aligned personal AI representatives, and societal awareness, while deprioritizing other approaches.
Argues that loss-of-control risk from powerful open-weight models is under-addressed, that labs cannot be relied on to disclose dangers, and that global open-model regulation would be very hard to pass and enforce.
A report assessing whether training data attribution can become practical on frontier LLMs, its benefits and disclosure barriers, and its potential for reducing large-scale AI risk via interpretability.