Open Distillation of Hereditary Traits
Shows that distilling a teacher's negative emotion, blackmail and Chinese censorship into student models transfers these traits even after filtering the relevant content, and tests mitigations.
Research / Sources
Discussion and research on AI alignment. alignmentforum.org
Shows that distilling a teacher's negative emotion, blackmail and Chinese censorship into student models transfers these traits even after filtering the relevant content, and tests mitigations.
Shows that prompted and simply trained backdoored model organisms are fragile to untargeted SFT, identifies factors like full-weight training and password-locking ratio that improve robustness, and urges baseline testing of safety techniques.
A write-up of a hobbyist attempt to find hidden backdoor triggers in Jane Street's DeepSeek-based dormant models, using weight diffs, SVD and activation probing. It cracks the warmup model and M1 but not M2 or M3.
Replicates the Sleeper Agents backdoor setup on Llama models and finds backdoor robustness to HHH SFT and pirate training depends heavily on optimizer, CoT-distillation, learning rate and model, sometimes reversing the original paper's findings.
Shows that sentiment toward entities like Catholicism or Reagan can be transferred across model families via LLM-filtered, normal-looking generated text, so covert data poisoning remains a risk even after filtering.
Speculatively links subliminal learning to lottery-ticket and mode-connectivity ideas, proposes a threat where shared initialization lets an attacker's trait propagate to deployed models, and suggests ablations.
Tests whether steering-vector and SAE-attribution methods can reverse-engineer semantic backdoor triggers in LLMs; they work on toy backdoors but fail on realistic settings.
Shows that training only on honest outputs can still increase reward hacking when the training prompt omits the hack-encouraging system prompt, via reasoning-trace effects (re-contextualization), in GPT-4o-mini code tasks.
Finds a linear misalignment direction in emergently misaligned Qwen models that steers and ablates misalignment and transfers across fine-tunes, and shows LoRA adapters specialise for general versus medical misalignment.}
Mechanistic replication on Gemma 3 12B finds risk-taking self-reports and conditional backdoors are largely driven by a single steering vector, with self-awareness backdoor results not reproducing.
A list of tractable research directions in AI control, covering elicitation without learning, synthetic inputs and facts, sandbagging and exploration hacking, data poisoning, and training attack policies.
Compares three crosscoder feature ablation and steering methods on a TinyStories sleeper-agent model, finding a gradient-based perturbation approach least sensitive to hyperparameter tuning.
Replicates stage-wise model diffing on a TinyStories sleeper agent using crosscoders, finding that features changing under fine-tuning are frequently relevant to the backdoor behaviour.
Argues that pretraining data about misaligned AI can make models more misaligned, proposes tests and mitigations for this self-fulfilling misalignment, and urges labs to act.](Note)
Finetuning aligned LLMs on a narrow insecure-code task induces broad misaligned behaviour across unrelated prompts, distinct from jailbreaking, and the effect can be hidden behind a backdoor trigger.
Finetuned LLMs can describe implicit learned behaviors, including some backdoor policies, without in-context examples, suggesting self-disclosure could aid oversight but also enable concealment.