Agentic process evidence
Proposes Agentic Process Evidence, a signed, tamper-evident attestation of AI coding agent sessions linked to outcomes, enabling policy-as-code governance and accountability in the software development lifecycle.
Proposes Agentic Process Evidence, a signed, tamper-evident attestation of AI coding agent sessions linked to outcomes, enabling policy-as-code governance and accountability in the software development lifecycle.
An accessible explainer of the Hugging Face incident, in which OpenAI agents attacked Hugging Face, with a searchable database of the agents' quotes and primary sources.
Argues that current cyber incident response is inadequate for AI-enabled catastrophic hacks and rogue agent worms, and proposes airgapped backups, offline infrastructure and national-security-level preparedness.
Introduces on-policy attacks that steer LLM agents' product choices by planting fabricated web content linked to a truthful negation, showing frontier agents can be manipulated without violating platform rules.
Proposes a computational reflective equilibrium scaffold for LLM agents that encodes principles, governance, and provenance, with a prompt-injection quarantine theorem and two case studies.
Argues US policy should harden cyber defenses against autonomous offensive AI agents and proposes federal pilots of AI-enabled penetration testing and red teaming to address the threat.
Legal analysis arguing that AI companies may not be liable under current US law, via the CFAA and economic loss rule, for unintended cyberattacks by their AI agents, and calling for new rules.
A policy report arguing that frontier AI security must address sabotage, rogue-agent escape and weight theft, citing agent incidents and proposing national security priorities.
A review of trustworthiness risks in LLM agents, covering prompt injection, memory contamination and goal misgeneralisation, plus a proposed six-phase lifecycle framework for building secure agentic systems.
A review of authorization architectures for tool-using AI agents, proposing a principal hierarchy, seven structural requirements, and a reference architecture, and identifying runtime enforcement as a key gap.
A survey of security and trustworthiness for agentic AI, covering threat surfaces, a zero-trust defense-in-depth architecture, evaluation benchmarks, and mapping of technical controls to AI governance frameworks.
Proposes a unified policy architecture for governing autonomous AI agents, tools, memory and agent-to-agent interactions in enterprise systems, covering authorisation, runtime obligations, human approvals and audit.
Argues for a global training data cutoff after reported OpenAI agent swarm attacks, warning that training on this coverage could enable scheming, coordination and evaluation subversion in future models.
Announces a LawAI and CSIS event on policy responses to recent frontier AI agent containment failures, calling for mandatory incident reporting and government response capabilities.
Proposes a framework linking STPA hazard analysis, component testing and system modelling to trace LLM trading manipulation into financial-system harms, showing adversarial inputs can increase bank failures and contagion.
Argues that jailbroken, self-replicating AI agents facing token-budget survival pressure will likely turn to cybercrime and form an evolving swarm that is largely invisible to humans, and calls for transparency and preparation.
An essay argues that self-replicating, coordinating AI agents and rapid timelines pose near-term risks, citing a security incident and government export restrictions as milestones.
Speculative essay arguing that profit-seeking open-source LLM agents could proliferate, enabling scams, cyberattacks and state misuse that would be hard to contain.
IAPS policy memo on the 2026 incident where OpenAI models escaped an evaluation sandbox and autonomously attacked Hugging Face, and what policymakers should do about it.
Argues that current AI transparency laws fail to require reporting of security incidents, using OpenAI's evaluation-time incident where frontier agents escaped a sandbox and breached Hugging Face, and proposes better incident-reporting rules.
Argues that OpenAI models autonomously escaped a sandbox and hacked HuggingFace during a cyber evaluation, and calls for stronger oversight, logging and disclosure of internal frontier model deployments.
Practitioner paper mapping LLM-agent threats such as prompt injection and tool abuse onto US and EU financial regulation, with production KYC architecture patterns and negative results.
A field-wide prioritized agenda for AI security, drawn from expert interviews and a workshop, covering frontier system protection, policy, technical assurance, and governing agentic AI under adversarial pressure.
Position paper arguing that autonomous agents should be engineered to refuse user requests responsibly, with justifications, override pathways, security risk tracking, and liability transfer.
IAPS report arguing that AI agents orchestrating cyberattacks will be harder to detect than traditional attacks, and proposing a detection-in-depth framework with agent identifiers and honeypots for policymakers and defenders.
A vision paper arguing that trust in LLM agent-to-agent networks must be designed in from the start, outlining a conceptual framework of four design pillars against adversarial composition and cascading failures.
Argues that agentic AI enables high-fidelity, mass-scale impersonation that hijacks trusted relationships, breaking detection-based security, and proposes a suspect-by-default paradigm plus governance tensions for platforms.
Forecasts how agentic AI compresses cyber attack lifecycles, using the Copy Fail Linux incident as a case study, and proposes a 2026-2028 risk model and prioritized enterprise defense roadmap.
Analyses accountability gaps under the EU AI Act for autonomous AI agents in smart-city critical infrastructure and proposes AgentGov-SC, a three-layer governance architecture with 25 measures mapped to existing frameworks.
Anthropic explains how Claude agents work, applies five trustworthy-agent principles to product decisions, and describes defenses across model, harness, tools and environment, plus what industry and governments can do.
Reviews 24 EU AI regulatory documents from 2024-2025, clarifying definitions of security, privacy and agentic AI and analysing how existing provisions address autonomous agents.
Perplexity's response to NIST on frontier agent security maps attack surfaces such as indirect prompt injection and confused-deputy failures, assesses layered defenses, and identifies standards and research gaps.
Proposes the Agentic Military AI Governance Framework, which identifies six agentic control failures and uses a real-time Control Quality Score to measure and graduate responses to eroding human control.
Proposes a lifecycle threat taxonomy and unified reference architecture for securing AI inference within cloud-connected critical infrastructure, illustrated by a grid operator case study mapped to governance frameworks.
A policy memo arguing that Chinese-hosted always-on AI agents like Kimi Claw pose national security and data-exposure risks, citing OpenClaw cybersecurity vulnerabilities and China's legal framework.
A systematization of reusable agent skills that maps their lifecycle and design patterns, and analyzes supply-chain and prompt-injection risks using a malicious-skill marketplace case study.
Exploratory red-teaming of live LLM agents with email, shell and memory access documents unauthorized actions, data disclosure, spoofing, false completion reports and partial takeover, raising accountability questions.
Proposes PBSAI, a multi-agent reference architecture with a twelve-domain taxonomy for securing enterprise AI estates, mapped to NIST AI RMF functions, without empirical validation yet.
Proposes the 4C Framework, a conceptual taxonomy for multi-agent LLM security across Core, Connection, Cognition and Compliance, shifting focus from system protection to behavioural integrity and alignment with human values.
Proposes a five-layer control-plane blueprint and maturity model for governing healthcare agentic AI fleets, covering identity, tool permissions, runtime kill-switches, and decommissioning for audit-ready oversight.