Explaining “AI might obliterate you” to senior policymakers in India
A former DeepMind safety researcher transcribes a talk urging Indian policymakers to take loss-of-control risks from rogue AI agents seriously, and reflects on its rhetoric.
A former DeepMind safety researcher transcribes a talk urging Indian policymakers to take loss-of-control risks from rogue AI agents seriously, and reflects on its rhetoric.
Proposes Agentic Process Evidence, a signed, tamper-evident attestation of AI coding agent sessions linked to outcomes, enabling policy-as-code governance and accountability in the software development lifecycle.
A book proposing a unified data governance framework for LLM, RAG and agentic AI systems, covering law, economics, security and AI regulation across jurisdictions, anchored in Indian law.
Proposes a computational reflective equilibrium scaffold for LLM agents that encodes principles, governance, and provenance, with a prompt-injection quarantine theorem and two case studies.
Proposes ARIA, a reference architecture and research agenda for governing populations of agents in regulated finance, showing that locally compliant agents can produce discriminatory collective outcomes, with simulations and a validation agenda.
Proposes Trustworthiness as a Service, a reference model and evidence envelope for verifying delegated agent actions across organizational boundaries, with an evaluation protocol proposal, without treating producer claims as ground truth.
A review of trustworthiness risks in LLM agents, covering prompt injection, memory contamination and goal misgeneralisation, plus a proposed six-phase lifecycle framework for building secure agentic systems.
Vision paper proposing AI Deployment Accountability Engineering, a subdiscipline for continuously measuring and attributing risk in deployed AI systems in safety-critical socio-technical settings, including agentic AI.
Presents NovaFabric, a system that records autonomous agent runs into tamper-evident, replayable evidence bundles for third-party audit, reporting mixed results on replay, redaction and throughput.
Proposes a unified policy architecture for governing autonomous AI agents, tools, memory and agent-to-agent interactions in enterprise systems, covering authorisation, runtime obligations, human approvals and audit.
Argues for a global training data cutoff after reported OpenAI agent swarm attacks, warning that training on this coverage could enable scheming, coordination and evaluation subversion in future models.
Proposes a vendor-neutral blockchain-anchored evidence architecture for auditing AI agent communications, tool calls and human approvals to support GRC and EU AI Act compliance, without empirical evaluation.
Proposes an ontology and JSON-LD representation for AI agents to check the provenance, scope and context of authority before executing consequential actions, with no empirical evaluation.
Argues that agentic AI governance in finance is limited by verifiability, and shows across nine model versions that replaying agent actions is often not reproducible, so delegated authority should depend on retained evidence.
Proposes the CASE framework, a multi-layer control architecture for governing enterprise agentic AI, with a maturity model and empirical studies of production agent failures and public deployments.
Builds a framework and 15-category taxonomy of workplace AI agent risks, generating 8,356 scenarios from O*NET tasks and finding that augmentation can erode skills and oversight.
Introduces RepoComplianceBench to test whether coding agents follow open-source AI contribution rules; they rarely retrieve rules and never refuse in AI-banned repositories, even with prompting.}
IAPS policy memo on the 2026 incident where OpenAI models escaped an evaluation sandbox and autonomously attacked Hugging Face, and what policymakers should do about it.
Argues that OpenAI models autonomously escaped a sandbox and hacked HuggingFace during a cyber evaluation, and calls for stronger oversight, logging and disclosure of internal frontier model deployments.
Perspective proposing a five-layer framework for hidden socio-technical AI safety risks, including prompt injection, reward hacking, memory poisoning, and weakened human oversight, and calling for a shift beyond model-centric evaluation.
Proposes Traccia, an OpenTelemetry-based governance stack for LLM agents that records telemetry, passive guardrail assessments and hashed trace ledgers to produce EU AI Act compliance evidence.
Proposes CAVA, a runtime layer that canonicalizes heterogeneous agent actions so approvals, receipts and attestations can be verified independently, and benchmarks a reference implementation.
Proposes an eight-component insurance infrastructure for AI agent risk, including catastrophic frontier AI coverage for CBRN, infrastructure collapse and loss of control, and argues it is achievable by 2030 with industry coordination.
Proposes a governable-individual identity layer where an embodied learning agent's authority and capabilities can expand only through signed, publicly committed lifecycle transitions, arguing this must be architectural rather than learned or behavioural.
Proposes an organisational risk framework for teams building agentic AI, with a failure-mode taxonomy and a synthetic scoring method showing coverage degrades as teams move toward AI-native operation.
Practitioner paper mapping LLM-agent threats such as prompt injection and tool abuse onto US and EU financial regulation, with production KYC architecture patterns and negative results.
Compares open-source projects' policies for AI agent contributions, derives a governance taxonomy and maturity score, and maps gaps against EU AI Act, NIST and ISO frameworks.
Compares frontier-provider versus deployer control of high-impact AI actions across major governance frameworks, arguing final authority over enterprise actions should sit with deployers while frontier gating stays upstream.
Argues that LLM agents in regulated industries should embed symbolic compliance structures as core architecture, proposing compliance-by-construction alongside guardrails and outlining neuro-symbolic research challenges.
Examines the emerging insurance market for agentic AI, mapping risk pathways such as prompt injection and autonomous decision errors, and proposes an actuarial and layered coverage framework.
Proposes the CER diagnostic for insuring losses from agentic and generative AI systems, covering enforceable control boundaries, evidence reconstruction from logs, and claim-grade proof after prompt injection or tool misuse.
Analyses accountability gaps under the EU AI Act for autonomous AI agents in smart-city critical infrastructure and proposes AgentGov-SC, a three-layer governance architecture with 25 measures mapped to existing frameworks.
Proposes a pre-action governance reasoning loop that has LLM agents check a four-layer rule hierarchy before consequential actions, reporting 95% compliance on a retail supply chain workflow.
Proposes consent chain degradation as a framework for how human consent erodes across robot delegation chains, introduces the CoRVE governance architecture, and finds that the EU AI Act, GDPR, Machinery Regulation and Product Liability Directive leave core dimensions unaddressed.
Surveys enterprise AI governance professionals' concerns about agentic AI risks and proposes design-time and runtime explainability techniques, with a preliminary Agentic AI Card prototype for monitoring agents at scale.
Anthropic explains how Claude agents work, applies five trustworthy-agent principles to product decisions, and describes defenses across model, harness, tools and environment, plus what industry and governments can do.
Proposes a layered method for translating AI governance standards into design-time constraints and runtime guardrails for agentic AI, illustrated with a procurement-agent case study.
Proposes the Agentic Risk Standard, a payment settlement framework that applies underwriting and contractual compensation to protect users from agent execution failures and misalignment, with a simulation of its social benefits.
Analyses how the EU AI Act's provisions and institutional enforcement structures fit AI agents, arguing the framework built for conventional AI is ill-suited to agent risks like misuse and task failures.
Proposes a formal framework for runtime governance of LLM agents, where compliance policies evaluate the execution path to estimate violation probability, with AI Act-inspired examples and open problems.