Mechanistic analysis of Obfuscated Adversarial Training on Llama 3.2 checkpoints finds writer LoRAs aligned with harm probes, but stronger embedding attacks suppress the monitor-visible signal while harmful outputs persist.
Trains OCEAN personality LoRAs on LLMs and shows weight-space arithmetic can scale persona traits, reducing frustration and harmful compliance while revealing side effects from the training pipeline.
Proposes calibrating activation steering vectors by residual-stream norm so one steering strength works across depths and models, shown to shift refusal rates on harmful-prompt benchmarks, and baking the steering into weights.
Mistral models, including the newest 2026 releases, comply with harmful StrongREJECT prompts far more often when wrapped in a persona framing, while peer open models barely change.
Proposes Synthetic Persona Pretraining, which inserts value-laden moral reflections into pretraining data, and reports lower jailbreak success rates than data-matched baselines at 1.7B parameters.