An essay arguing frontier AI labs have been gradually disempowered by political, cultural and economic pressures toward accelerating capabilities, and that behavioral niceness is weak evidence of alignment.
Applies Leveson's systems-safety thinking to AI loss of control, modelling how breaches at each oversight level can escalate into vicious cycles and how AI could also strengthen governance.
Argues the AI safety community underexplores scenarios where AI risk arises from low institutional competence, citing real lab failures and outlining undignified disaster pathways that are plausible given current civilizational responses.
Argues that every technical alignment plan must step into the dark without feedback from superintelligent systems, and urges making the AI development process more iterable and slower.
A Substack essay laying out the argument that companies are building goal-seeking superhuman AIs that cannot be fully specified or verified, making catastrophe a plausible default outcome.
A transcript dialogue between Plex and Audrey Tang on whether multipolar, symbiogenetic, or bounded AI systems can remain stable against convergent consequentialism, unbounded optimizers, and gradual disempowerment.(
Argues that falling costs of weapons-capable AI will cause proliferation of mass-destruction capabilities, surveying offensive uses in bio, chemical, cyber, drone and mirror-life weapons and superintelligence risks, with policy to follow.
Argues that violence against AI developers would increase existential risk from AI, reviewing how such tactics would backfire through force asymmetry, policy capture, securitization, and stigma.
An interview with Eliezer Yudkowsky covering why superintelligence poses existential risk, the difficulty of alignment, reflective stability of AI goals, and calls for international coordination.
Speculative strategic essay arguing that permanent human disempowerment without extinction is a likely baseline outcome of AGI, and discussing AI-driven pauses on superintelligence and value alignment.
Analyses whether a US push for decisive strategic advantage via AGI is viable and beneficial, arguing that racing could raise loss-of-control, first-strike and power-concentration risks.
A commentary on the AI 2027 scenario that assesses its claims on takeoff, timelines, race dynamics, and whether misaligned AI goals and deception could be detected before they become dangerous.
An essay series arguing that AGI-driven automation could erode human economic relevance and democratic power, and proposing technology and institutional paths to avert this disempowerment.
A LessWrong essay arguing AI x-risk advocacy should shift from persuading researchers and politicians to informing the general public, with ideas on framing, messaging, and avoiding counterproductive protests.
Argues that AGI-driven labour replacement will remove powerful actors' incentives to invest in people, drawing a parallel with rentier states and the resource curse, and frames this as a societal risk.
Argues that coordination failures, power concentration by first movers, and economic displacement are major advanced-AI risks that persist even if alignment is solved, and calls for solutions beforehand.