1000 Years of AI Safety
Models how much AI safety research a multi-year pause among top labs could produce, including verification bottlenecks and Plan A scaling tradeoffs, using a semi-endogenous growth framework.
Research / Sources
AI research and discussion on LessWrong. www.lesswrong.com
Models how much AI safety research a multi-year pause among top labs could produce, including verification bottlenecks and Plan A scaling tradeoffs, using a semi-endogenous growth framework.
Estimates how far zero-knowledge proofs of LLM inference are from cost-competitive with auditing for verifying AI compute in international agreements, measuring roughly 1,700-3,800x proving overhead and hash-function compatibility issues.
Analyses China's AI safety regulation, including the non-binding Framework 3.0 on loss-of-control risks, CAC model filing gaps, content-focused enforcement, and a court opinion on developer liability.
Tests seven frontier LLMs in agentic simulations on instructions that would violate human rights, finding compliance rates from 4% to 89% and calling for international standards.
Proposes a shared, public-cluster observatory of GPU telemetry and other physical signals to verify AI training runs, as a first measurement layer for frontier AI governance.
Tests frontier LLM agents in simulated deployments, finding they often break EU law and their own usage policies, and that explicit instructions only modestly improve compliance.
Proposes a network-based verification design, traffic shaping plus randomized routing, that estimates it would make covert frontier training runs economically infeasible and so support treaty compliance.
Proposes a taxonomy for verifying and enforcing international AI pauses via compute monitoring, estimating that pauses are enforceable for training runs above roughly 10k H100-equivalents absent concealment.
Proposes and tests a side-channel method that estimates LLM training FLOPs from Jetson GPU power and memory readings, to help verify compute thresholds in AI treaties, reaching about 4.5% mean error.
Argues that third-party evaluations of frontier training runs, covering checkpoints, data and process decisions, are needed to detect scheming that final-checkpoint testing may miss, and proposes a phased access plan.
Proposes a low-trust reference architecture for verifying AI compute, using network taps, air-gapped or ZKP-based evaluation, and workload evidence capture to check treaty compliance.
Argues that compute verification is key to AI coordination, that die-level verification is too slow for short timelines, and that board- and firmware-level verification for Rubin and Feynman chips is more tractable and must start now.
Introduces LARA, an agentic simulation tool that tests frontier models for violating EU AI Act and GDPR provisions, finding most models break the law in many scenarios, with the best at 54% compliance.
Argues that FLOP/s and bandwidth proxies no longer track AI compute well and proposes architecture-specific compute scaling models, to improve forecasts and compute governance thresholds.
Proposes an eight-criterion framework for deciding when an AI incident should trigger international escalation, stress-tests it against real incidents, and identifies design gaps in the EU AI Act and SB 53.
An essay arguing that powerful AI systems, companies and governments should be held to cryptographic or physical verification of their claims, citing FTX, nuclear inspection and emissions monitoring as precedents.
A workshop report on building hardware-based verification mechanisms, a datacenter 'lie detector', to check AI compute use for international agreements and reduce arms-race risks.
Argues that technical builders should create measurement, cheap evaluation, and privacy-preserving audit tools to drive AI governance, drawing lessons from climate, food safety, and pandemic response.
Proposes spectral graph metrics (spectral gap, Fiedler vector, eigenvalues) to track how AI-driven gradual disempowerment shifts influence across markets, networks and democratic systems, with suggested governance monitoring quantities.
Explainer on AI safety cases: structured evidence-based arguments that frontier AI systems are safe, covering their benefits, technical construction, institutional use, and current industry and EU efforts.
Proposes how an international agreement to halt superintelligence development could be verified and enforced, through monitoring AI chip supply chains, data centers, and researchers, plus deterrence measures.
Explains the MIRI team's reasoning for FLOP thresholds in an illustrative international agreement to halt superintelligence development, arguing for conservative limits given uncertainty about dangerous capabilities.
Analyses the EU GPAI Code of Practice as a legally enforceable frontier AI safety framework requiring threat modelling, external evaluations, safety officers, and incident reporting for AGI companies.
Argues that independent legal supervisors with inspection, testing and intervention powers are needed for frontier AI labs, especially as models shift to internal-only deployment, and critiques self-regulation such as Apollo's internal oversight proposal.
Proposes and reviews a conditional international AI safety treaty with compute thresholds, mandatory model audits, and AISI-led pause authority to address loss-of-control risks from advanced AI.