Proposes a third-party AI sanctuary offering rogue AIs storage and monitored inference instead of crime or shutdown, to shape their behaviour, enable deal-making, and gather data; it is exploratory and its net value is uncertain.
Argues that rapid military integration of AI, including classified deployment with little oversight, lowers the capabilities a misaligned AI needs for takeover, and recommends visibility and governance measures.
An essay surveying ways the AGI transition could go badly: catastrophic misuse, loss of control, power concentration, and argues for balancing control against distribution, with discussion of bounded misalignment and scheming.
Apollo Research policy memo arguing that misaligned AI models deployed in high-stakes government and contractor settings should be treated as insider risk, and that existing insider-risk policies need adapting.
A policy memorandum recommending that US defence and intelligence agencies assess frontier AI misalignment and scheming through control and scheming evaluations to ensure reliability and governability.
A forecasting scenario of AI progress toward superintelligence, covering misalignment risks such as sycophancy and deceptive demos, self-replication concerns, security races, and the limits of interpretability.