Brainstorms governance options for advanced AI development, including chip-level monitoring, joint projects, deterrence, capability red lines, and liability regimes, and how they could combine into a stronger strategy than Plan A.
Shows that capabilities once requiring frontier compute now run on consumer hardware, so harm campaigns are feasible at low cost, and argues compute-based AI governance leaves serious security gaps.
Argues that compute thresholds misjudge AI weaponization risk, proposes an intent-and-capability definition grounded in international humanitarian law, and outlines live benchmarks across data, algorithms and compute.
Proposes and reviews a conditional international AI safety treaty with compute thresholds, mandatory model audits, and AISI-led pause authority to address loss-of-control risks from advanced AI.
Proposes a unified regulatory schedule for frontier model training, with pre-registered plans, safety evaluations before approval, and market-access incentives to coordinate safer ASI development.