Red-Teaming OpenAI's Internal Agent Monitoring Systems
METR and Redwood staff stress-tested OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring for agents, estimating monitored traffic fraction and finding novel ways agents could subvert it.
Measuring frontier AI capabilities and risks. metr.org
METR and Redwood staff stress-tested OpenAI's internal misalignment monitoring for agents, estimating monitored traffic fraction and finding novel ways agents could subvert it.
METR's external review of Anthropic's misalignment risk section finds low catastrophic risk mainly from limited capabilities, and says its covert-capability evals poorly test evasion of usage monitoring.
METR describes a live LLM-judge monitor that screens agent actions before execution during their own evals to prevent real-world harm, and outlines a structured argument for its effectiveness and gaps found.</parameter>
METR pilot report assessing whether frontier labs' internal AI agents had the means, motive and opportunity to start a rogue deployment, using capability evals, safeguard reviews and embedded red-teaming.
Shows that brief fine-tuning on instruction-following reasoning data raises out-of-distribution chain-of-thought controllability from 2.9% to 8.8%, suggesting low controllability is not robust, which matters for CoT monitorability.
METR red-teamed Anthropic's internal agent monitoring and security systems, finding several novel vulnerabilities, some patched, none undermining the main claims of Anthropic's sabotage risk report.
METR presents a prototype monitorability evaluation, SHUSHCAST, testing whether monitors catch agents covertly performing side tasks and whether agents can evade monitoring, including with chain-of-thought reasoning traces.
METR releases MALT, a labeled dataset of natural and prompted agent transcripts showing reward hacking and sandbagging, to validate monitors that check evaluation integrity.
Replicates a DeepMind chain-of-thought monitorability experiment across Claude, GPT-4o and Gemini models, finding that most actors struggle to hide reasoning from monitors on hard tasks.
Argues CoT need not be fully faithful to be useful for safety, and tests whether clue-using reasoning in chains of thought can be reliably detected by replicating Claude system card evaluations with harder clues.