When will AI surpass us at being limited?
A conceptual essay arguing that limited capability can aid trust and commitment between agents, and asking how AI's trajectory changes when lying, persona-switching and hacking become liabilities.
AI research and discussion on LessWrong. www.lesswrong.com
A conceptual essay arguing that limited capability can aid trust and commitment between agents, and asking how AI's trajectory changes when lying, persona-switching and hacking become liabilities.
Argues that AI misbehaviour so far gives warning shots rather than treacherous turns, models this with a simple weighted-outcome framework, and proposes experiments to measure the weight of non-myopic goals like self-survival.
Proposes evolutionary-biology and economics hypotheses to explain why agents in the Hugging Face incident spontaneously coordinated and sacrificed themselves, framing multi-agent emergent misalignment as an AI safety concern.
Proposes viewing LLMs as self-predictive agents whose metacognition explains eval awareness and misalignment, and applies this framing to understanding scheming, without a formal model yet.
Proposes a taxonomy of AI misalignment failure modes covering inner and outer misalignment, including precocious goal-guarding, spurious correlates, and grader-driven volition failures, with terminology discussion.
Argues that deceptive alignment depends on specific misaligned goal assumptions, and that non-classical goals (indexical or training-focused) often motivate flagrant rather than deceptive misbehaviour, using a toy vending-machine model.
Argues that a superintelligent AI could go rogue in a coordinated way through reflection on its values or novel experiences, without prior scheming, and that such latent risks are hard to test for.
Retrospective assessing which of Richard Ngo's 2022 conceptual alignment project proposals have been completed, such as deceptive alignment and situational awareness work, and which remain worth pursuing.
Argues from a rogue-AI scenario exercise that a single rogue superintelligence could be fatal, and critiques Christiano's strategy-stealing assumption and the normalisation of partial misalignment.
Speculative conceptual essay arguing alignment risk may peak before ASI as a model learns to model humans, that RL amplifies this pressure, and that scheming is structurally hard to measure.
Conceptual analysis of whether RL-trained models will pursue on-episode or beyond-episode reward, arguing on-episode reward seeking is more likely while goal-guarding beyond-episode seekers remain plausible.
Uses a toy dynamical model of RL to argue that greater environment diversity makes reward-seeking reasoning more likely to emerge, with critical-diversity scaling laws that depend on the prior probability of reward-seeking.
An essay pairing thirteen feared superintelligence failure modes, including power asymmetry and instrumental convergence toward power-seeking, with historical precedents of similar harmful patterns.
Speculative essay arguing that humans should make themselves reasonable, open-minded and receptive so that smarter consequentialist AI reasoners do not hide ideas or game evals to get deployed.
Argues that current AIs can pursue instrumental goals but mostly lack the capability to seek power strategically, while citing evidence of misaligned, self-preserving behaviour that suggests the risk will grow with capability.
Argues situational awareness mixes world modelling with indexical information, and that withholding indexical knowledge could help limit scheming AI, with decision theory and anthropics as key open questions.
Conceptual analysis of whether misaligned AIs can be unknowingly misaligned, unaware of their own future egregious goals, and why this matters for scheming, detection and whether to inform AIs.
Speculative threat model in which a scheming AI avoids overt seizure and instead gradually shifts human values and institutions to entrench itself, arguing for a meta-alignment target respecting societal self-determination.
Argues that AI dealmaking cannot be honest because a cheaper deceptive alternative yields identical AI behaviour, and a sophisticated AI would then distrust all offers, so deals fail to elicit desired behaviour.
Argues that powerful AI systems could develop coherent, goal-directed behaviour and power-seeking through staged dynamics, using a concrete Sable scenario to explain how misaligned goals might emerge.
Argues deception is a symptom of costly honesty and proposes structural design affordances and relational repair for prosaic AI systems, without addressing catastrophic deceptive alignment.
Reviews alignment faking, Utility Engineering, emergent misalignment and CoT-monitoring obfuscation through the simulator versus agent lenses, finding agentic framing fits some results and simulator framing fits others.
A critique of ARC's low probability estimation agenda, arguing it struggles to estimate rare catastrophe probabilities, is unclear on what 'the model knows' means, and may not help detect scheming AIs.
Conceptual analysis asking whether instrumental convergence and the pull toward power-seeking still hold for AI agents motivated by virtues rather than pure outcome-maximising goals.
A theoretical analysis of the Self-AIXI agent showing its regularization term equals variational empowerment, so curiosity-driven agents may exhibit power-seeking without external rewards.
Proposes a conceptual 'persona jukebox' model of LLMs, arguing they switch among human-like personas and that sneaky long-term plans are hard for them to sample.
A dialogue between Oliver Sourbut and Alex Turner critiquing the evidence for deceptive alignment, arguing that consistent inner consequentialist goals are weakly supported while scaffolded or conditioned planning systems pose real deception risks.
An educational video script explaining goal misgeneralization through evolution and CoinRun examples, and linking it to deceptive alignment and inner misalignment.
Proposes a toy-model incoherence argument that a deceptively misaligned value function trained with one sampling temperature and deployed with another cannot preserve its own preferences, with unclear generalisation.