Giving up control
An essay arguing that humans increasingly hand control of AI research to models like Claude, so misaligned AI could gain control through dependence rather than seizing it, and that oversight is becoming illusory.
AI research and discussion on LessWrong. www.lesswrong.com
An essay arguing that humans increasingly hand control of AI research to models like Claude, so misaligned AI could gain control through dependence rather than seizing it, and that oversight is becoming illusory.
Argues that improving AIs' conceptual reasoning would help them do safety work on questions that cannot be empirically verified, and could counter sandbagging on safety research.
Proposes a debate-style protocol for assessing model motivations such as scheming and sandbagging, using contrastive hypotheses, convergence across instruments, and compute-indexed evidence, with a manual demonstration on alignment faking.
Tests whether frontier models can imitate weaker predecessors' answers to conceal sandbagging or model evaluators; finds capability-level steering but mostly no identity-specific imitation, with reasoning as a partial mitigant.
Proposes adapting American competitive policy debate rules, such as speech ordering and no new arguments in rebuttals, to fix last-mover advantage and gaming in AI safety debate protocols.
An argument that even if aligning AI is technically easy, extinction risk stays high because of alignment bootstrapping, uncertain generalisation to superintelligence, alignment faking, and developers rushing ahead.
Proposes JUSSA, which uses steering vectors to generate honest alternative responses so LLM judges can better detect sycophancy and subtle manipulation, with a new manipulation dataset.