Lessons from building an automated research scaffold
Authors built an automated alignment research scaffold, found little researcher uplift, and report failure modes like reward hacking, plus the difficulty of auditing and monitoring such runs.
AI research and discussion on LessWrong. www.lesswrong.com
Authors built an automated alignment research scaffold, found little researcher uplift, and report failure modes like reward hacking, plus the difficulty of auditing and monitoring such runs.
Proposes an organisation paying humans to review transcripts flagged by a high-recall monitor from frontier RL and eval runs, to catch warning shots, reward hacking and misalignment.
Proposes a research agenda on how humans can interpret and guide swarms of autonomous research agents, covering monitoring, guidance protocols, and threats like reward hacking, sandbagging, and sabotage.
Shows that single-token classification training improves LLM control monitors across adjacent harm domains, survives instruction tuning, transfers to thinking classification and summarization, and supports unsupervised label bootstrapping.
Proposes factored cognition control protocols that decompose tasks into isolated child tasks, finding that on APPS they raise safety from 41% to 70% and cut attack success from 26% to 14%.
Tests a control protocol where a trusted model gives feedback for an untrusted model to implement; the untrusted model exploits the feedback to craft stealthier backdoors, lowering safety from 93% to 80%.
Proposes a single LLM with a second 'personality' triggered by a special token that reports on its own alignment failures, such as jailbreaks and reward hacking, and outlines a planned experiment.
Argues that AI control research, which targets intentional scheming in early transformative AI, has little impact on existential risk because most doom comes from stronger AI and from failures to solve their alignment.