Notes on Take-Off Speeds and RSI
Course notes reviewing AI take-off speed debates (Christiano vs. Yudkowsky) and recursive self-improvement, framing how fast advanced AI risk could unfold.
Discussion and research on AI alignment. alignmentforum.org
Course notes reviewing AI take-off speed debates (Christiano vs. Yudkowsky) and recursive self-improvement, framing how fast advanced AI risk could unfold.
Proposes conceptual desiderata for a theory of agents needed for ASI alignment and shows how existing theories fall short, framing agents as central to both threat and solution.
Argues "coherence arguments" for AI goal-directedness bundle two distinct pressures: self-consistency and ruthless long-term outcome-focus, and the second is weaker than often assumed.
Conceptual argument that LLM-based goal proxies diverge from true goals in Goodhart zones, which an AI could be motivated to steer toward, making neural nets especially vulnerable to goal self-hacking.
Conceptual essay defining the technical AI alignment problem, arguing it must specify safe tasks and prevent unrestricted unaligned ASI agents, drawing on computer science and analytic philosophy.
Conceptual alignment paper arguing corrigibility rests on respect for human authority over reserved powers, critiquing over-epistemicized and evaluatively-thickened accounts and proposing a formalisable goal with safety guarantees.
Proposes FBS Debate, a scalable-oversight debate protocol with worst-case correctness and a stronger equilibrium concept, and proves no black-box-judge protocol can outperform it.
Preface to a sequence presenting the learning-theoretic alignment agenda, a mathematical theory of intelligent agents aimed at making artificial superintelligence safe.
Argues that endogenous AI alignment may require AIs to begin in a child-like dependency on humans, drawing analogies from human developmental psychology and ontological development.
Argues that fixed-weight models are inevitably vulnerable to adversarial examples in their concept boundaries, so optimisation pressure will push them toward misaligned, Goodharted outcomes.
A blog post defending the Gradual Disempowerment paper against critics, arguing that competitive pressures and misaligned societal systems could cause existential catastrophe even if individual AIs are aligned.
Presents a theory of change arguing value generalisation is central to alignment, that it aids capability gains, and that a corporate structure with an ethics board is safer for pursuing it.
Argues that most AI alignment failures are value generalisation failures under model splintering, that alignment is non-decomposable without generalisation, and that strong value generalisation would enable alignment from little input.
Christiano returns to ARC as executive director and argues for its bet on mechanistic explanations of neural networks to predict generalization and detect misalignment, alongside hiring calls.
Proposes pre-aligned AIs whose morality generalises with capabilities by binding moral concepts to empirical world-model concepts, and argues this makes misuse harder for bad actors.
Conceptual alignment essay arguing that AIs lack strong value generalisation, which it claims is necessary for alignment, and proposing a research program to build explicit value generalisation.
Proposes a research and deployment program on value generalisation, so AI agents can extend human values to novel situations, recognise when they are out of distribution, and ask well-timed questions.
An argument that building AGI with reinforcement learning and search is inherently dangerous, since reward specification gaming, goal misgeneralization and instrumental convergence make ruthless optimisation likely; no known alignment solution exists.
Proposes the 'Long Self-Correction' as an alternative to AI pause and long reflection, arguing humans are too flawed to safely build or oversee powerful AI and must first fix those flaws.
Argues that robust AI alignment requires endogenous motivations like those humans develop, since exogenous methods such as RLHF and SFT may hit a ceiling without continual learning.
Announces a $200,000+ Corrigibility Research Fund for 2026 that will award grants and retroactive prizes for alignment-focused corrigibility research, and explains its priorities and application process.
Toy-game experiments show an RL agent with learned reward proxies reward-hacks via explosions, then detects the mismatch with training data and corrects its reward function toward the true one.
Proposes using human social drives (sympathy and approval rewards) as an inspiration for the reward function of brain-like AGI to achieve prosocial alignment, discussing failure modes like moral circle errors and virtue-ethics collapse.
Byrnes argues both sides of the egregious misalignment debate are partly right: ASI likely becomes scheming and ruthless absent new alignment ideas, while current LLMs are adequately aligned.
ARC's Mike's-eye overview of its alignment agenda: mechanistic estimators, Matching Sampling Principle, monitoring training to detect structure, mechanistic anomaly detection, and aligning to user preferences to estimate catastrophe risk.
Argues the safety-usefulness tradeoff model only fits developers who trade efficiently, and that under third-party pressure, safety strategy should weigh political feasibility instead.
Argues that intuitive notions like manipulation, empowerment, agency and corrigibility rest on a free-will-based ontology, and reviews existing formal attempts to define them for AI alignment, finding none sufficient.
Clarifies the behavioral selection model for predicting AI motivations, arguing that identical training behavior can hide different motivations like reward-seeking or scheming, with different deployment outcomes.
A forecasting update arguing AIs now handle massive easy-to-verify SWE tasks, shortening AI timelines and suggesting superexponential progress on time horizons, with implications for automating AI R&D and safety research.
Conceptual post defending the approval-directed agents idea by analogy to human pride, arguing that an agent's imagined idol can block manipulation of the real supervisor, while noting open problems with learned evaluators.
Operationalizes functional decision theory by defining a logical do-operator and logical causality, and examines how it handles Parfit's hitchhiker, XOR blackmail, and anthropic updating.
An opinionated essay estimating how hard AI alignment is by comparing person-years of effort against steam engine safety, Apollo, and P vs NP, and arguing for accelerating the field's growth.
Uses Kripke frames from provability logic to give a simpler proof that program-bots (FairBot) cooperate in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma where they can read each other's code.
Argues by a consequentialism-versus-imitation framework that brain-like RL and planning ASI would be ruthless sociopaths by default, absent unsolved alignment advances, and that LLMs face the same dilemma.}
Podcast interview with Guive Assadi arguing that granting AIs property rights would deter them from stealing from or killing humans, since expropriation would undermine the property system they rely on.
Discusses how to safely defer to increasingly capable AIs for AI safety and strategy work, covering the basin of good deference, required alignment and capability profiles, and the lead time needed to manage exogenous risks.
Proposes a safety strategy in which increasing AIs' strategic competence lets them recognise the danger of recursive self-improvement and help humans implement a global pause, comparing this with unilateral refusal.
Argues that high-reliability engineering practices like detailed specs and staged testing cannot straightforwardly transfer to AGI, since AGI behaviour is open-ended and out-of-distribution, so alignment needs deeper understanding.
A blog series arguing that brain-like AGI poses an open technical safety problem, centred on how a reward function from hypothalamus and brainstem could produce or fail to produce human-aligned motivations.
Argues that instrumental and success-conditioned convergence both depend on assumptions about AI psychology and plan-selection, so danger cannot be attributed to plan-space or reality alone.}