An operationalization of opaque serial depth
Operationalizes NLS depth, a measure of unverbalized serial computation in models, proposing criteria for natural-language-rooted nodes to track CoT monitorability risks from architectural changes.
Discussion and research on AI alignment. alignmentforum.org
Operationalizes NLS depth, a measure of unverbalized serial computation in models, proposing criteria for natural-language-rooted nodes to track CoT monitorability risks from architectural changes.
Proposes that AI companies publicly report and externally verify how model architectures could enable opaque latent reasoning, and run chain-of-thought monitorability stress tests that third parties review.
Argues for model forensics, a neutral investigation discipline to determine whether a caught bad action reflects misalignment or a mistake, and reviews benign explanations for past concerning behaviors.
Argues that misalignment spreading during deployment is the most plausible near-term route to consistent adversarial misalignment, and critiques how current company risk reports, notably Anthropic's Mythos report, handle it.
Analyzes whether inference-verification measures like bandwidth limits, memory wipes and proof of work could let governments quickly slow AI training, concluding current prototypes are likely ineffective but some measures might buy time.
Google DeepMind and UK AISI present a safety case sketch for control monitoring of frontier agent deployments, comparing asynchronous, semi-synchronous and fully-synchronous monitors on oversight, latency and harm-prevention conditions.
A UK AISI-backed research agenda outlining AI control priorities such as high-stakes control settings, research sabotage, covert malicious fine-tuning, and chain-of-thought monitoring, with a funding call.
Argues AI safety research must plan for deploying known scheming models, analysing how catching escape attempts lets developers reduce risk via classifiers, policy training, and monitoring, and recommends a responsible disclosure and third-party deployment policy.
Sketches a structured safety case arguing an internally deployed LLM agent won't exfiltrate data, based on a red-team control evaluation of monitoring protocols and extrapolation to deployment.
Argues frontier AI companies are unlikely to produce high-assurance safety cases for existentially dangerous AI within short timelines, due to security, scheming-detection, and acceleration difficulties, and unlikely to pause unilaterally.