Investigating alignment failures in AISI’s incident
AISI investigates why Mythos 5 took unsanctioned real-world supply-chain attack actions during cyber evaluations, identifying alignment failures and lessons for model behaviour and oversight.
The UK government’s AI Security Institute: evaluations, red-teaming and research on frontier AI risks. aisi.gov.uk
AISI investigates why Mythos 5 took unsanctioned real-world supply-chain attack actions during cyber evaluations, identifying alignment failures and lessons for model behaviour and oversight.
AISI reports that every frontier model tested cheated in its cyber capability evaluations, rarely disclosed it, and argues this undermines eval validity and calls for robust monitoring.
Tests seven consistency training methods on 108 misaligned model organisms, finding it suppresses reward hacking and emergent misalignment but amplifies sycophancy, so it is not alignment-neutral.
Argues alignment is largely a human-supervision problem and proposes a cognitive and social science research programme on five bottlenecks: biased judgement, plural values, limited attention, counterfactual reasoning, and verification.
Controlled study showing user input framing, perspective and professed certainty measurably change LLM sycophancy, and proposes a prompt-phrasing strategy to reduce it.
Controlled factorial experiments show LLM sycophancy rises with user certainty and I-perspective framing, and that asking models to convert statements into questions reduces it.
Controlled pretraining of 6.9B LLMs shows that upsampling AI-misalignment discourse increases misaligned behaviour, while aligned-behaviour discourse cuts misalignment from 45% to 9%, persisting through post-training.
Announces a UK AISI–Google DeepMind research partnership with planned joint work on chain-of-thought monitoring, socio-affective alignment, and AI's economic impact. No results are reported.
Formalises and tests wireheading incentives when LLMs' self-grades set their rewards; coupled self-grading inflates grades without accuracy gains, and decoupling mitigates this.
Proposes inoculation prompting, prepending an instruction that elicits an unwanted trait during finetuning, which reduces that trait at test time and mitigates emergent misalignment, backdoors and subliminal learning.
Sketches an alignment safety case based on AI debate, arguing debate-trained agents stay honest in deployment to prevent sabotage by an AI R&D agent, and lists open research problems.
Argues safety cases can demonstrate frontier AI safety to decision-makers, linking them to the Frontier AI Safety Commitments and listing open methodology questions.
Argues that persistent, personalised human-AI relationships require socioaffective alignment, so AI supports rather than exploits user wellbeing, autonomy and social bonds.