Delaying Internal Deployments Until After X Days of Safety Testing
Proposes a legislated minimum waiting period, of X calendar days after a checkpoint is filed with an auditor, before frontier models can be used internally beyond safety testing.
Frontier safety frameworks, developers' internal governance and risk management, release decisions, transparency.
Proposes a legislated minimum waiting period, of X calendar days after a checkpoint is filed with an auditor, before frontier models can be used internally beyond safety testing.
Argues frontier developers should regularly publish transparency disclosures on whether chain-of-thought reasoning remains monitorable, citing risks to CoT oversight from unfaithfulness, encoding and training pressure.
A 2026 report from China's WIC AI committee reviewing frontier AI risks, global governance practices, readiness gaps, and proposing coordinated governance mechanisms.
Argues that a METR investigation indicates Anthropic's RSP "dramatic acceleration" threshold is already crossed, with AI automating AI R&D, implying much shorter AI timelines.
Reviews open problems in evaluating general-purpose chatbots for mental-health risks like sycophancy and delusion reinforcement, and argues for real-world data access and evidence-based policy.
Argues that frontier AI makes recursive self-improvement plausible, that no clear frameworks predict its outcomes, and offers a game-theoretic analysis of whether to start RSI when rivals might too.
Introduces BMMS, a policy-conditioned suite that scores LLM compliance with published rulebooks, with an attribution-based admission test; finds GPT-4o fails 70.7% of its Model Spec hard constraints versus 0% and 9.1% for Claude models.
Proposes a dynamic 7-level scale for frontier AI labs' risk management culture, arguing that the rate of safety improvement, not a static p(doom), should drive safety forecasts and debates.
Argues that Anthropic's IPO disclosures of catastrophic AI risks are welcome but insufficient, and that laws enforcing minimum safety standards are needed to protect the public.
METR's high-access external assessment of whether AI is accelerating AI R&D at Anthropic, with much of the supporting evidence redacted, limiting public verification.
METR reviews Anthropic's risk report on automated AI R&D, finding catastrophic risk was low but the early-warning threshold may have been crossed, and that the report understates acceleration.
Uses Project Glasswing's restricted release of a vulnerability-finding model to show access helped firms find and fix more flaws, without evident attacker gains, but created cross-country asymmetry.