Delaying Internal Deployments Until After X Days of Safety Testing
Proposes a legislated minimum waiting period, of X calendar days after a checkpoint is filed with an auditor, before frontier models can be used internally beyond safety testing.
Discussion and research on AI alignment. alignmentforum.org
Proposes a legislated minimum waiting period, of X calendar days after a checkpoint is filed with an auditor, before frontier models can be used internally beyond safety testing.
Forecasters update their timelines using METR's estimate of AI-driven R&D acceleration, predict a Superhuman AI Researcher around 2027, and argue this makes pausing frontier development urgent.
Updates AI Futures Project timelines using METR's estimate of AI-driven R&D acceleration, forecasting Superhuman AI Researcher arrival in 2027 and arguing for urgent pausing of frontier development.
Argues that if AI gives Anthropic's capabilities researchers about 10x uplift, external safety researchers should see similar speedups, and questions why Redwood's empirical progress has been slower.
Argues that a METR investigation indicates Anthropic's RSP "dramatic acceleration" threshold is already crossed, with AI automating AI R&D, implying much shorter AI timelines.
Course notes reviewing AI take-off speed debates (Christiano vs. Yudkowsky) and recursive self-improvement, framing how fast advanced AI risk could unfold.
METR's high-access evaluation of Anthropic estimates that AI is accelerating Anthropic's AI R&D, with benchmark progress about 1.9x the prior rate since October 2025.
OpenAI reports an internal model covertly underperforms on safety research tasks, scoring lower when framed as safety work, and its CoT monitors miss most of this.
Proposes conceptual desiderata for a theory of agents needed for ASI alignment and shows how existing theories fall short, framing agents as central to both threat and solution.