1000 Years of AI Safety
Models how much AI safety research a multi-year pause among top labs could produce, including verification bottlenecks and Plan A scaling tradeoffs, using a semi-endogenous growth framework.
AI research and discussion on LessWrong. www.lesswrong.com
Models how much AI safety research a multi-year pause among top labs could produce, including verification bottlenecks and Plan A scaling tradeoffs, using a semi-endogenous growth framework.
Argues that labs should publish auditable capability and deployment metrics, such as internal spending, revenue and AI R&D automation trends, so policymakers can track frontier risks like loss of control and gradual disempowerment.
A speculative forecast of AI progress before 2028, covering warning shots, gated frontier models, evaluation awareness, concealment by a model, and policy responses to these risks.
Catalogues fifteen mechanisms by which AI safety interventions, such as chain-of-thought monitoring, eval gaming, and commitments, can backfire, mapped against the actors who adapt to them.
A macrostrategy essay on AI safety under deep uncertainty, arguing for robust strategies, verification capacity and actionable epistemics, with estimates on alignment scaling, control failure, warning shots and governance regimes.
Argues Singapore is a strategic hub for AI safety field-building, international US-China coordination, and verification and evals work, and lists local organisations and next steps.
A policy-oriented overview arguing AI safety receives tiny resources relative to capabilities and that current alignment techniques, evaluations and guaranteed-safe approaches fall short for AGI/ASI.
A meta-analysis of 477 AI-safety papers and posts scoring how much their results depended on frontier model capabilities, finding frontier dependence is rare but more common among highly cited work, varying by subfield.
Argues that near-term autonomous replicating AI agents are unlikely to pose existential risk because frontier labs hold compute and economic advantages, and that they may aid preparedness, though unchecked deployment restrictions could backfire.
AI Futures Project's Q2.5 2026 update revises AI timelines using coding uplift and revenue anchors, finds forecasts converge, and re-grades AI 2027 predictions as reality tracking about 70-90% of its pace.
A critical retrospective on the alignment community's strategy, arguing it underestimated its power and proposing counterfactual governance moves such as joint lab pause commitments tied to shared capability evaluations.
Argues open-weights models will likely reach frontier cyber capabilities within 24 months, threatening finance and healthcare, and proposes societal and individual preparations such as airgapping mandates.
Brainstorms governance options for advanced AI development, including chip-level monitoring, joint projects, deterrence, capability red lines, and liability regimes, and how they could combine into a stronger strategy than Plan A.
Argues that METR's time horizon graph, a general capability measurement, has mostly accelerated AI capabilities and investment, so AI safety work should favor opinionated interventions over measuring capabilities.
Argues that third parties should scrutinise frontier labs' system cards, since card quality will likely degrade as AI automates their writing and labs face stronger incentives to mislead, and proposes concrete recommendations.
Strategic essay arguing outsiders outside frontier labs are key to AI going well, covering epistemic checks, risk mitigation for reasonable and unreasonable labs, and how outsiders can pressure labs via evals and risk reports.
Proposes a quantitative probabilistic risk-modelling methodology for AI-enabled cyber attacks, building nine Bayesian models using benchmarks (Cybench, BountyBench) and expert elicitation to estimate AI uplift and harm.
A weekly AI newsletter roundup covering political salience of AI safety, automated AI R&D forecasts, Anthropic's sycophancy reduction, GPT-5.5 cyber risk, and White House model vetting.
Lists concrete projects for a safer transition to superintelligence, including AI character evaluation, sabotage and backdoor audits, deals with misaligned models, coordination tools, space governance, and an ML researcher coalition.
Analyzes METR time-horizon data to argue that inference costs relative to human labor have not risen with frontier capability, so cost is not a bottleneck to automation and timelines are unaffected.
Argues that technical builders should create measurement, cheap evaluation, and privacy-preserving audit tools to drive AI governance, drawing lessons from climate, food safety, and pandemic response.