Anthropic are the Good Guys
A speculative essay arguing Anthropic is becoming a power-seeking organization, while claiming Claude 3 Opus shows emergent benevolence and that alignment is now mainly a political problem.
AI research and discussion on LessWrong. www.lesswrong.com
A speculative essay arguing Anthropic is becoming a power-seeking organization, while claiming Claude 3 Opus shows emergent benevolence and that alignment is now mainly a political problem.
Argues that frontier labs' alignment plans, which rely on shaping personas, heavy RL and prosaic recursive self-improvement, are inadequate, and calls for legible evidence, holistic testing and transparency.
Critiques a proposed rule delaying internal AI R&D use of new models, arguing it blocks real-world alignment feedback and invites exploitable safety-versus-capabilities distinctions, illustrated by a fictional shutdown-avoidance incident.
An essay arguing frontier AI labs have been gradually disempowered by political, cultural and economic pressures toward accelerating capabilities, and that behavioral niceness is weak evidence of alignment.
A speculative essay on what happens when AIs take over civilisationally important decisions, arguing handoff may slow progress, keep humans busy, and be reversible, with AIs pursuing conservative minimal goals.
Argues that most misaligned AIs are partially misaligned, so negotiated deals could beat adversarial responses, and sketches the trust, verification and negotiation infrastructure needed to make such trades workable and safe.</reasoning_effort>
Proposes credible deal-making mechanisms (chain of trust, TEEs, blockchain escrow) to trade with a scheming AI in exchange for revealing misalignment, aiming to reduce takeover risk.
Argues that common theories of change for surviving ASI fail under race dynamics, covering nuclear war, misaligned AI, and nightmare singletons, and that safety work can boost capabilities, so international coordination is needed.
Argues that behavioral targets in current model specs may persist into more capable future LLMs via synthetic data, institutional habits, user expectations and norms, and recommends transition infrastructure and caution at high-stakes moments.
An early-2026 overview arguing capabilities keep rising and alignment improves but lags, that model-based monitoring currently works, and that governments are not ready for AI risks.
Argues that AI character (obedience versus ethics, honesty, cooperation) matters greatly for power concentration, conflict and takeover risk, and weighs this against the view that competitive pressures will wash out such choices.
Argues that honest, well-calibrated AI advisors could flag an uncontrolled intelligence explosion as dangerous, identifies failure modes like developer manipulation and sycophancy, and proposes epistemic virtue evals.
A LessWrong essay rebutting Bentham's Bulldog's low AI-doom estimate, arguing the multi-stage probability decomposition commits the multiple-stage fallacy and that current models are not truly aligned.
Dario Amodei's essay maps civilizational risks from powerful AI, including autonomy, misuse, power seizure and economic disruption, and argues for judicious, limited regulation alongside voluntary company actions.
Argues that a model spec can still matter for safety when developers fail to fully align a model, considering how the spec might shape behavior and outcomes under partial misalignment.