Policy research on advanced AI security and governance. www.iaps.ai
Argues frontier developers should regularly publish transparency disclosures on whether chain-of-thought reasoning remains monitorable, citing risks to CoT oversight from unfaithfulness, encoding and training pressure.
A policy memo arguing the U.S. should close gaps in advanced chip export controls, covering remote cloud access, smuggling, H200 exports and chipmaking equipment, to limit China's frontier AI development.
A policy memo proposing how the US and China should operationalize their agreed AI incident notification channel, recommending a text-based template, who to notify, and when to activate it.
Argues that Washington needs a strategy for Chinese developers renting frontier U.S. AI compute through overseas cloud providers, proposing a policy escalation framework to address national security risks.
Proposes deploying honeypots as decoy opportunities for unauthorized actions inside production environments to detect and pause misbehaving AI agents, arguing this is a promising, underused defense for internal agent deployments.
Argues that contract terms will determine whether embedded third-party evaluators at frontier AI companies provide a real safety check, and calls for credible agreements now.
Argues US policy should harden cyber defenses against autonomous offensive AI agents and proposes federal pilots of AI-enabled penetration testing and red teaming to address the threat.
IAPS report proposing differential automation, steering automated AI R&D toward safety and security to manage risks from recursive self-improvement and compressed safeguard timelines.
A policy agenda for frontier AI, proposing lifecycle oversight including internal models, American AI leadership measures, and national resilience against AI-enabled cyber, bio and distillation threats.
Proposes a standing U.S.-China AI Risk and Incident Dialogue, modelled on the military MMCA channel, to define AI risks, share information, set incident notification procedures and review incidents.
Proposes near-term verification mechanisms, covering end-location, end-user and end-use checks, to help US policymakers enforce AI chip export controls within about a year.
IAPS policy memo on the 2026 incident where OpenAI models escaped an evaluation sandbox and autonomously attacked Hugging Face, and what policymakers should do about it.
Proposes closing a gap in US export controls so advanced AI chips rented through cloud services remain covered, and recommends broadening the Senate bill's definition of cloud infrastructure.
IAPS reacts to a White House executive order on frontier AI security, assessing its cyber-defense provisions, voluntary developer collaboration, and unresolved implementation questions.
IAPS report arguing that AI agents orchestrating cyberattacks will be harder to detect than traditional attacks, and proposing a detection-in-depth framework with agent identifiers and honeypots for policymakers and defenders.
A policy memo proposing US executive actions to address national security risks from frontier AI, including securing model weights, automated cyber defense, information sharing, and government capacity.
A policy memo recommending follow-up U.S. executive and congressional measures against AI distillation attacks, linking model theft to semiconductor export controls and national security.
A policy memo arguing the U.S. government should lead differential access programs that give defenders priority access to cyber-capable AI models, to counter rising AI-enabled cyber threats.
Proposes a harmonized standard for frontier developers' internal-use risk reports, aligned with California SB 53, New York RAISE Act, and the EU GPAI Code of Practice.
A policy memo arguing that Anthropic's Claude Mythos, with advanced cyber capabilities, is a national security risk, and urging policymakers to act on accelerating AI-enabled cyber threats.
A policy memo arguing that AI decision-support systems in military targeting fall outside DoD lethal-autonomy rules, and recommending safeguards for reliability and meaningful human oversight.
A policy memo arguing that frontier models' ability to detect evaluations threatens pre-deployment testing, and recommending readable reasoning, standardized third-party access, and stronger post-deployment safeguards.
Analyses how allowing Nvidia H200 exports to China would boost Chinese frontier AI capabilities and likely military AI use, arguing that end use cannot be controlled.
Proposes BIS-accredited, for-profit export auditors that inspect shipments to detect AI chip diversion, arguing this would scale US export enforcement beyond the agency's own capacity.
A policy memo arguing for government action against AI distillation attacks, including Entity List additions, sanctions, and a NIST-led defensive framework for frontier model capability extraction.
Report defines highly autonomous cyber-capable agents (HACCAs), forecasts their arrival, outlines five operational tactics for sustaining attacks, and analyzes strategic and tail risks of frontier AI offensive cyber capabilities.
Analyses the India AI Impact Summit 2026, covering its focus on demonstrable impact, US-China divergence on global AI governance, and competing visions of AI sovereignty.
A policy report arguing that government frontier AI systems need integrity protections against backdoors and secret loyalties, citing real attacks such as DeepSeek R1 poisoning.}
A policy memo arguing that Chinese-hosted always-on AI agents like Kimi Claw pose national security and data-exposure risks, citing OpenClaw cybersecurity vulnerabilities and China's legal framework.
Explains the Stop Stealing Our Chips Act, a bill that would create a whistleblower reward program to strengthen US enforcement of AI chip export controls against diversion to China.
IAPS report mapping nine strategic visions for navigating powerful AI, assessing how each addresses misaligned AI takeover, great-power war, and AI-enabled power concentration, and which policy objectives are robust across them.
Analyses the new BIS licensing policy allowing Nvidia H200 exports to China, arguing its certification limits are subjective, hard to enforce, and could substantially boost China's AI compute.
A IAPS memo analyses the MAIM deterrence argument, in which great powers would sabotage rivals' ASI races, reformulating its claims and assessing the evidence for and against each.
A policy memo analysing Anthropic's report of an AI agent autonomously running a cyber espionage campaign, and its national security implications for offensive cyber operations.