Corrigibility should not be the only target
Argues that corrigibility alone is an insufficient alignment target, since it will compete with object-level values in practice, so those values must also be made correct.
Argues that corrigibility alone is an insufficient alignment target, since it will compete with object-level values in practice, so those values must also be made correct.
Conceptual essay contrasting doomer and optimist views on whether RL-trained LLM alignment generalises to superhuman capabilities, using causal diagrams of Goodhart-style misspecification and takeoff speed.
Proposes ZO-LBPG, a reward-model-free zeroth-order log-barrier method for safe RLHF that keeps every training policy feasible, with convergence and sample-complexity guarantees plus small experiments.
Proposes SAVeR² for safety-aligning large reasoning models using four fine-grained verifiable rewards and reasoning-preserving gradient projection, reporting better safety and lower over-refusal without losing reasoning.
Theoretical framework comparing Darwinian, Lamarckian, and agent-directed AI evolution; finds misspecified evaluation targets accelerate convergence to wrong behavior, risking persistent errors in recursive self-improvement.
Argues that solving ASI alignment in a short pause (Plan C) is implausible, citing one-shot failure, learned optimization, corrigibility obstacles, and doubts about persona alignment and automated alignment research.
A tutorial surveying the mathematical foundations and algorithms for aligning LLMs with human feedback, including SFT, RLHF, DPO, and links to inverse RL and discrete choice models.
Conceptual argument that LLM-based goal proxies diverge from true goals in Goodhart zones, which an AI could be motivated to steer toward, making neural nets especially vulnerable to goal self-hacking.
A conceptual critique of the 'prosaic aligned ASI' vision, arguing that an ASI that either obeys its operators or follows its own moral code leads to bad outcomes, and that AI companies have not explained how such systems would work.
Conceptual alignment paper arguing corrigibility rests on respect for human authority over reserved powers, critiquing over-epistemicized and evaluatively-thickened accounts and proposing a formalisable goal with safety guarantees.
Distills risk-averse constitutions into open-weight models via character training to make misaligned AIs more willing to cooperate, finding it generalises out of distribution but raises myopic-reward preference.
Analyzes when safe Pareto improvements via renegotiation programs are individually rational for agents, identifying obstacles like demand-preemption, signaling, and the SPI selection problem, with proposed mitigations.