Policy research on advanced AI security and governance. www.iaps.ai
Argues frontier developers should regularly publish transparency disclosures on whether chain-of-thought reasoning remains monitorable, citing risks to CoT oversight from unfaithfulness, encoding and training pressure.
A policy memo arguing the U.S. should close gaps in advanced chip export controls, covering remote cloud access, smuggling, H200 exports and chipmaking equipment, to limit China's frontier AI development.
A policy memo proposing how the US and China should operationalize their agreed AI incident notification channel, recommending a text-based template, who to notify, and when to activate it.
Argues that Washington needs a strategy for Chinese developers renting frontier U.S. AI compute through overseas cloud providers, proposing a policy escalation framework to address national security risks.
Proposes deploying honeypots as decoy opportunities for unauthorized actions inside production environments to detect and pause misbehaving AI agents, arguing this is a promising, underused defense for internal agent deployments.
Argues that contract terms will determine whether embedded third-party evaluators at frontier AI companies provide a real safety check, and calls for credible agreements now.