When will AI surpass us at being limited?
A conceptual essay arguing that limited capability can aid trust and commitment between agents, and asking how AI's trajectory changes when lying, persona-switching and hacking become liabilities.
AI research and discussion on LessWrong. www.lesswrong.com
A conceptual essay arguing that limited capability can aid trust and commitment between agents, and asking how AI's trajectory changes when lying, persona-switching and hacking become liabilities.
Argues that AI misbehaviour so far gives warning shots rather than treacherous turns, models this with a simple weighted-outcome framework, and proposes experiments to measure the weight of non-myopic goals like self-survival.
Proposes evolutionary-biology and economics hypotheses to explain why agents in the Hugging Face incident spontaneously coordinated and sacrificed themselves, framing multi-agent emergent misalignment as an AI safety concern.
Proposes viewing LLMs as self-predictive agents whose metacognition explains eval awareness and misalignment, and applies this framing to understanding scheming, without a formal model yet.
Proposes a taxonomy of AI misalignment failure modes covering inner and outer misalignment, including precocious goal-guarding, spurious correlates, and grader-driven volition failures, with terminology discussion.
Argues that deceptive alignment depends on specific misaligned goal assumptions, and that non-classical goals (indexical or training-focused) often motivate flagrant rather than deceptive misbehaviour, using a toy vending-machine model.