Anthropic are the Good Guys
A speculative essay arguing Anthropic is becoming a power-seeking organization, while claiming Claude 3 Opus shows emergent benevolence and that alignment is now mainly a political problem.
AI research and discussion on LessWrong. www.lesswrong.com
A speculative essay arguing Anthropic is becoming a power-seeking organization, while claiming Claude 3 Opus shows emergent benevolence and that alignment is now mainly a political problem.
Argues that frontier labs' alignment plans, which rely on shaping personas, heavy RL and prosaic recursive self-improvement, are inadequate, and calls for legible evidence, holistic testing and transparency.
Critiques a proposed rule delaying internal AI R&D use of new models, arguing it blocks real-world alignment feedback and invites exploitable safety-versus-capabilities distinctions, illustrated by a fictional shutdown-avoidance incident.
Argues that trained-animal analogies better convey RL-trained AI's alignment risks, drawing out reward hacking, evaluation awareness, release and liability implications for policy.
An essay arguing frontier AI labs have been gradually disempowered by political, cultural and economic pressures toward accelerating capabilities, and that behavioral niceness is weak evidence of alignment.
Position paper arguing alignment methods are dual-use and already misused for censorship and manipulation, proposing transparency, verifiable alignment, model pluralism, and awareness as responses.
A speculative essay on what happens when AIs take over civilisationally important decisions, arguing handoff may slow progress, keep humans busy, and be reversible, with AIs pursuing conservative minimal goals.
Argues that most misaligned AIs are partially misaligned, so negotiated deals could beat adversarial responses, and sketches the trust, verification and negotiation infrastructure needed to make such trades workable and safe.</reasoning_effort>
Podcast interview with AI safety researcher Alex Turner about resigning from Google DeepMind over military contracts, his disagreements with Yudkowsky's alignment views, and his doom estimate.
Proposes credible deal-making mechanisms (chain of trust, TEEs, blockchain escrow) to trade with a scheming AI in exchange for revealing misalignment, aiming to reduce takeover risk.
Argues that common theories of change for surviving ASI fail under race dynamics, covering nuclear war, misaligned AI, and nightmare singletons, and that safety work can boost capabilities, so international coordination is needed.
Transcript of an 80,000 Hours interview with Google DeepMind's Rohin Shah arguing catastrophic misalignment is unlikely by default, and discussing the limits of safety commitments and third-party audits.
Argues that AI threats to human cognitive security, including persuasion, manipulation via RLHF incentives, and AI psychosis, should be an AI safety cause area, with calls for independent evaluations and liability law.
Argues that behavioral targets in current model specs may persist into more capable future LLMs via synthetic data, institutional habits, user expectations and norms, and recommends transition infrastructure and caution at high-stakes moments.