Policy research on advanced AI security and governance. www.iaps.ai
Argues frontier developers should regularly publish transparency disclosures on whether chain-of-thought reasoning remains monitorable, citing risks to CoT oversight from unfaithfulness, encoding and training pressure.
A policy memo arguing the U.S. should close gaps in advanced chip export controls, covering remote cloud access, smuggling, H200 exports and chipmaking equipment, to limit China's frontier AI development.
A policy memo proposing how the US and China should operationalize their agreed AI incident notification channel, recommending a text-based template, who to notify, and when to activate it.
Argues that Washington needs a strategy for Chinese developers renting frontier U.S. AI compute through overseas cloud providers, proposing a policy escalation framework to address national security risks.
Proposes deploying honeypots as decoy opportunities for unauthorized actions inside production environments to detect and pause misbehaving AI agents, arguing this is a promising, underused defense for internal agent deployments.
Argues that contract terms will determine whether embedded third-party evaluators at frontier AI companies provide a real safety check, and calls for credible agreements now.
Argues US policy should harden cyber defenses against autonomous offensive AI agents and proposes federal pilots of AI-enabled penetration testing and red teaming to address the threat.
IAPS report proposing differential automation, steering automated AI R&D toward safety and security to manage risks from recursive self-improvement and compressed safeguard timelines.
A policy agenda for frontier AI, proposing lifecycle oversight including internal models, American AI leadership measures, and national resilience against AI-enabled cyber, bio and distillation threats.
Proposes a standing U.S.-China AI Risk and Incident Dialogue, modelled on the military MMCA channel, to define AI risks, share information, set incident notification procedures and review incidents.
Proposes near-term verification mechanisms, covering end-location, end-user and end-use checks, to help US policymakers enforce AI chip export controls within about a year.
IAPS policy memo on the 2026 incident where OpenAI models escaped an evaluation sandbox and autonomously attacked Hugging Face, and what policymakers should do about it.
Proposes closing a gap in US export controls so advanced AI chips rented through cloud services remain covered, and recommends broadening the Senate bill's definition of cloud infrastructure.
IAPS reacts to a White House executive order on frontier AI security, assessing its cyber-defense provisions, voluntary developer collaboration, and unresolved implementation questions.
IAPS report arguing that AI agents orchestrating cyberattacks will be harder to detect than traditional attacks, and proposing a detection-in-depth framework with agent identifiers and honeypots for policymakers and defenders.
A policy memo proposing US executive actions to address national security risks from frontier AI, including securing model weights, automated cyber defense, information sharing, and government capacity.