AI research and discussion on LessWrong. www.lesswrong.com
An essay arguing that AI should be governed as a potentially abnormal technology, critiquing the 'AI as Normal Technology' framing on loss-of-control risk, gradual disempowerment, and competitive pressure.
Argues that proposed AI sanctuaries for rogue agents would create selection effects and resource dynamics that undermine their goals, and that the study-and-release plans are constrained.
Argues that coordination among AI developers to avoid building dangerous AI deserves serious, concrete discussion like a real geopolitical negotiation, and that leaders should explain why they consider it infeasible.
Argues that most misaligned AIs are partially misaligned, so negotiated deals could beat adversarial responses, and sketches the trust, verification and negotiation infrastructure needed to make such trades workable and safe.</reasoning_effort>
A LessWrong essay rebuts Narayanan and Kapoor's 'AI as normal technology' thesis, arguing AI is categorically transformative and that diffusion-speed and intelligence-measurement arguments understate its risks and impact.
A personal guide to lobbying US policymakers on advanced AI risk, covering meeting tactics, credibility, concrete policy asks, and follow-up, with the author's reported engagement results.
Proposes an empirical agenda testing whether AI safety researchers can detect flawed automated-alignment outputs, and argues early successes may breed overconfidence and call for governance lines near handover to AI.
Argues that open-weight models undermine the defenses proposed for near-future AI risks, since guardrails can be fine-tuned away, use cannot be monitored, and bad actors have access by default.
A Substack essay laying out the argument that companies are building goal-seeking superhuman AIs that cannot be fully specified or verified, making catastrophe a plausible default outcome.
Speculative essay arguing that humans might voluntarily hand control to AI, possibly via insiders training deliberately misaligned models, and that GPU embargoes and alignment research would not stop this.
Commentary on a RAND report claiming a superintelligence could be contained by hardening world infrastructure against harm, arguing the proposed safeguards are weak and implementation and buy-in remain major obstacles.
Proposes eight conceptual pathways by which gradual disempowerment could become permanent even if AIs are shutdownable, covering principal choices, legal lock-in, value drift and coordination failure.